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THE DECALOGUE IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY *

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TANNAITE rabbis were accustomed to summarize succinctly the 611 or 613 commandments of the Law in from one to eleven general precepts; [1] but these summaries were merely private *halakoth*. Until the second century A.D. there were read in the synagogue service the Ten Words which God himself spoke directly to his people, without the mediation of Moses.[2] A Hebrew papyrus from about 200 B.C. includes the Decalogue with the Shema.[3] And Philo [4] goes so far as to declare that "the Ten Words are summaries of the special laws which are recorded in the sacred books."

In the Hellenistic Judaism represented by Philo the commandments were divided into two sets of five.[5] The first group "begins with God the Father and Maker of all, and ends with parents who copy his nature by begetting particular persons. The other set of five contains all the prohibitions." [6] Some men observe only the first group, others only the second.[7] The latter may be called φιλάνθρωποι, the former φιλόθεοι.[8] Here we find the same kind of summary of the two tables of the Law, possibly interpreting them in the light of the Shema and Leviticus xix. 18, as in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.[9] And it is interesting to observe the

* This paper was read at a joint meeting of the midwestern groups of the American Oriental Society and the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis at Chicago on April 27, 1946. Note that the commandments are numbered according to the usage of the author discussed.

[1] G. F. Moore, Judaism in the Age of the Tannaim II (Cambridge, 1927), 83–85.
[2] C. Taylor, Sayings of the Jewish Fathers (ed. 2, Cambridge, 1897), 119 f.
[3] R. H. Charles, The Decalogue (ed. 2, Edinburgh, 1926), vii–xxxiii; W. F. Albright in JBL 56 (1937), 145–76.
[4] Philo, Dec. 154.
[5] Ibid. 50 f., 106, 121.
[6] Ibid. 51.
[7] Ibid. 108 f.
[8] Ibid. 110.
[9] Issachar v. 2 (p. 112 Charles), Dan. v. 3 (p. 137).

author of the Testaments, like Philo (and Paul [10]), stressing the necessity of keeping all the commandments.[11] The same man will "steal, injure, grasp, defraud, and give alms to the poor." But "he who defrauds his neighbor provokes God to anger. . . . He sets aside the Lord who commanded the Law. Another commits adultery and fornicates and abstains from meats; fasting he does evil." The patriarch Asher advises his children to "keep the true good in all the commandments of the Lord." [12]

Two types of apologetic for the Decalogue are known to us: the idea that nature itself proclaims the truths of the Ten Words, and the idea that they are so sacred that "it is not lawful for us to speak them openly, word for word." [13] There is no clear evidence that either concept was widely disseminated, although probably wherever Jews like Philo came in contact with educated Gentiles the first could be utilized. Jewish enthusiasm for the Decalogue diminished as a result of Christian use in the second century, and it was withdrawn from the synagogue liturgy.[14]

In the teaching of Jesus the Decalogue possesses much the same importance as in contemporary Judaism generally. Jesus regards it as supremely important,[15] and yet he does not hesitate to reinterpret it, to teach "with authority and not like the scribes." [16] On the one hand he rejects rigorist Sabbath observance by the question, "On the Sabbath is it right to do good or to do evil, to save a life or to kill?" (Mark iii. 4) and by the story of the sheep lost on the Sabbath (Matthew xii. 10–14).[17] In Mark ii. 27 he says bluntly that "the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath." On the other hand he speaks of the Pharisees and scribes as abandoning the commandment of God and keeping the tradition of men (Mark vii. 8); the example of this practice which he gives is their rejection of the fifth command-

[10] Galatians v. 3.

[11] Asher ii. 5–10 (p. 175 f.); Philo, Spec. ii. 13. Asher emphasizes the Decalogue.

[12] Asher vi. 3 (p. 179).

[13] Josephus, Ant. iii. 90 (he paraphrases them); see W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles (Cambridge, 1939), 29.

[14] See note 2 above; Moore, op. cit., I 291.

[15] Mark x. 17–19 and parallels.

[16] On the meaning of this expression see D. Daube in JTS 39 (1938), 45–59; also C. H. Dodd in G.K.A. Bell-A. Deissmann, Mysterium Christi (London, 1930), 53–66.

[17] Contemporary Jewish interpretation in Strack-Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch I (München, 1922), 622–30.

ment in favor of a primitive form of tax-exemption called Korban.

It is not probable that Jesus' teaching concerning the Decalogue was as systematic as the evangelist Matthew (v. 21–48) makes it. This series of antitheses beginning with murder and adultery and ending with love of neighbor seems to reflect the evangelist's conception of a new Law given on a new Sinai.[18] In his view Jesus brings the old Law "to full expression." [19] As a Christian Jew he alters Mark vii. 10, "Moses said" (the fifth commandment), to "God said" (Matthew xv. 4). Nevertheless, on various occasions Jesus apparently reenforced some of the commandments of the second table by interpreting them in relation to the "desire" forbidden in the tenth commandment.[20] The inner motive or *yecer* is determinative.[21] What results from this reenforcement is not only a renovated Decalogue but also a renovated Holiness Code,[22] which concludes with "You shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" — a reference to Leviticus xix. 2.

Indeed, Jesus' summary of the Law, like that in the Testaments, is expressed in the words of the Shema and the Holiness Code. In Mark xii. 28–34 one of the scribes is represented as being in complete accord with Jesus concerning the "first commandment of all." Jesus answered, "The first is, Hear, Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord, and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind and with all thy strength. This is the second: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. No other commandment is greater than these" (Mark xii. 29–31). When the scribe agrees with this statement, Jesus says to him, "You are not far from the reign of God." Similarly in another summary, the so-called "Golden Rule," he gives the traditional interpretation of Leviticus xix. 18: "All things that you would have men do to you, so do unto them" (Matthew vii. 12).[23]

[18] Matthew v. 1, xxviii.16; see E. v. Dobschütz in ZNW 27 (1928), 338–48.

[19] E. Klostermann, Das Matthäusevangelium (ed. 3, Tübingen, 1938), 41.

[20] Matthew v. 28; compare Romans vii.7.

[21] Moore, op. cit., I 479–93; F. C. Porter in Biblical and Semitic Studies by Members of the Faculty of Yale University (New York, 1901), 91–156.

[22] P. Carrington, The Primitive Christian Catechism (Cambridge, 1940), 94–96; see E. G. Selwyn, The First Epistle of St. Peter (London, 1946), 413.

[23] On this see L. J. Philippidis, Die "Goldene Regel" religionsgeschichtlich untersucht (Eisleben, 1929).

The emphasis of Jesus' teaching is largely on the second table of the Decalogue, which deals with man's relation to man. To the rich young man he quotes it thus (Mark x. 19): "You know the commandments: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, *thou shalt not defraud*, honor thy father and mother." The italicized words are probably a halakic substitute for the ninth and tenth commandments.[24] Do they reflect a special Galilean form of the Decalogue, as Lohmeyer has urged? [25] It seems more likely that they are directed to the situation of Jesus' hearer.

Ethical behavior is motivated by faith in God and in the immediate coming of his kingdom. The first table of the Law is not neglected, for "we love because he first loved us" (I John iv. 19). It is the teaching of Jesus which is interpreted here, as it is in the two subsequent verses. "If anyone says, I love God, and hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen. And we have this commandment from him, that he who loves God should also love his brother." The "commandment" is clearly Jesus' own summary of the Law.[26]

What the Law meant in Judaism and in early Christianity may be seen in the experience of the apostle Paul. Before his conversion he had been the strictest of Pharisees. He had been "blameless as regards the righteousness which is found in the Law" (Philippians iii. 6), or so he tried to believe. It was in this righteousness that he found justification for his "boasting" (see Galatians i. 13–14).[27] "The Law was not simply 'the moral law' in a general sense. It was the symbol of the glory of Israel which gave him self-respect before the world." [28] In his conversion he came to realize the futility of the Law as he had conceived it. Legal

[24] E. Lohmeyer, Das Evangelium des Markus (Göttingen, 1937), 210; see B. H. Branscomb, The Gospel of Mark (New York–London, 1937), 182. Possibly from Leviticus xix.3 or Deuteronomy xxiv.14: C. H. Toy, Quotations in the New Testament (New York, 1884), 48.

[25] Galiläa und Jerusalem (Forschungen z. Rel. u. Lit. des A. und N. Testaments 52, Göttingen, 1936), 84 f.; see F. C. Grant, The Earliest Gospel (New York–Nashville, 1943), 144.

[26] A. E. Brooke, The Johannine Epistles (New York, 1912), 127; C. H. Dodd, The Johannine Epistles (London, 1946), 123.

[27] C. H. Dodd in Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 17 (1933), 97–101.

[28] Ibid., 99.

righteousness is not righteousness before God (Galatians ii.16). In fact, "those whose religion is a matter of law-observance are really under a curse; as the Law itself says . . . , 'Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the Book of the Law, to do them.' And again, as evidence that no one can be righteous in God's sight on a basis of law, let me quote this text: 'The just shall live by faith.' But law certainly has nothing to do with faith; instead, 'The man that doeth them [i.e., observes the precepts] shall live by them.' As for the curse upon the disobedient, which perhaps you have been led to fear, Christ has set us free from that; and he did so in fact by taking upon himself the curse, instead of us. As still another text has it, 'Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.' " [29] This Law, this covenant from Mount Sinai, simply led to slavery (Galatians iv. 24). Moreover, it made Christ, who did not know sin, to be himself sin (II Corinthians v. 21), since he became accursed under the Law. In these discussions, as in the famous seventh chapter of Romans, St. Paul has almost nothing favorable to say of the Law. It was merely a slave to take us to school, but now that we have learned our alphabet it can be discarded.[30] And yet in its time it was necessary, and it contained an element of promise (Galatians iii. 8).

When Paul describes the Law as "laid down through angels, by the hand of a mediator" (Galatians iii. 19), one might infer that he does not intend to deny the permanent validity of the Decalogue for while the haggada concerning the angels could be used to prove either the importance [31] or the unimportance [32] of the Law, it must be remembered that the Decalogue, unlike the rest of the Law, was not spoken through Moses. Moreover, while in Romans vii. 7–11 he explicitly assigns to the tenth commandment the cause of his spiritual death, he also emphatically declares that the commandment is "holy, just, and for our good" (Romans vii. 12).[33] And "God has done what the Law, weakened here by

[29] Galatians iii. 10–13, after a paraphrase by my father.

[30] Galatians iv. 6; see my note in HTR 39 (1946), 71–73.

[31] Stephen in Acts vii. 53, Herod in Josephus, Ant. xv. 136; see M. Dibelius, Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus (Göttingen, 1909), 26–28.

[32] Here and in Hebrews ii. 2.

[33] See C. H. Dodd, Romans (New York–London, 1932), 111f. He compares Deuteronomy vi. 24.

the flesh, could not do; by sending his own Son in the guise of sinful flesh, to deal with sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, in order to secure the fulfilment of the Law's requirements in our lives, as we live and move not by the flesh but by the Spirit." [34] One way or another the *virtus decalogi*, as Irenaeus [35] calls it, had to be preserved. From the oral tradition Paul knew the summary of the Decalogue which Jesus had set forth. In Galatians v. 14 he quoted "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" as the essence to be retained out of a now superseded Law. Similarly in Romans xiii. 8, after discussing the divine origin of secular authority, he adds that " 'Thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not desire' — these and any other commandment are summed up in a single word: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' Love never wrongs a neighbor; that is why love is the fulfilment of the Law." [36] The high place here given the Decalogue is evident.

In a relatively late Pauline epistle we can see how far Paul went to retain (and recover) the substance of the Decalogue. Colossians iii. 5–6 lists vices which bring the wrath of God; they are "fornication, impurity, passion, evil desire, and the covetousness which is idolatry." Is not this list based on a combination of the sixth (fornication, impurity, passion) and tenth (evil desire, covetousness) commandments interpreted in relation to the first table of the Law (idolatry)? [37] A subsequent reference (Colossians iii. 20) to obedience to parents as pleasing to the Lord confirms the impression that Paul has the Decalogue in mind.

The author of Ephesians (vi. 1–3) makes explicit the reference to the Law. "Children, obey your parents in the Lord; for this is right. 'Honor thy father and mother' — which is the first commandment with a promise [38] — 'that it may be well with thee and that thou mayest live long on the earth.' " Moreover in Ephesians iv. 25–36 there seems to be implicit a paraphrase of the second

[34] Romans viii. 3–4 (Moffatt).

[35] See note 76 below.

[36] Romans xiii. 8–10 (partly as translated by Moffatt).

[37] This seems to me more likely than Dibelius' (An die Kolosser Epheser An Philemon [ed. 2, Tübingen, 1927], 31) idea of the mystical number five for the principal sins of the heathen, a "Fünf-Lasterkatalog."

[38] See G. Schrenk in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament II 549.

table of the Law. "To be angry but not to sin" is based on "thou shalt not kill"; "let the thief no longer steal"; "let no evil talk come out of your mouths"; "let all bitterness and wrath and anger and clamor and slander be put away from you, with all malice"; these are equivalent to the seventh through tenth commandments; the fifth ("first . . . with a promise") is quoted in Ephesians vi. 2, and the sixth is mentioned in Ephesians v. 3: "But immorality and all impurity or covetousness (the traditional combination of the sixth and tenth commandments) must not even be named among you." And therefore it is not named in the list above.

In one of the Pastoral Epistles the Decalogue plays a small but significant part. In I Timothy i. 8–10 we find paraphrased most of the commandments of both tables.[39] "Now we know that the Law is good, if anyone uses it lawfully, understanding this, that the Law is not laid down for the just but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and sinners, for the unholy and profane (first through fourth), for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers (fifth), for manslayers (sixth), immoral persons, sodomites (seventh), kidnapers (eighth), liars, perjurers (ninth)." Here "murderers" of parents are condemned because in the Old Testament a penalty was provided for murder but not for failing to honor one's parents; similarly kidnaping takes the place of theft. These distinctions are rabbinic.

In the "epistle" of James,[40] as in the Pastorals and in the gospel of Matthew, there is an attempt to present Christianity as a new law. Legalistic rigor is no longer the great problem for these writers; their enemy is antinomianism. Pauline teaching, as we see from I Corinthians, could all too easily be misunderstood. Against antinomians parts of the writing of James are directed. "If you really fulfill the royal law, according to the scriptures: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' you do well. But if you show partiality, you commit sin, and are convicted by the Law as transgressors. For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become guilty of all of it. For he who said, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' also said 'Thou shalt not kill.' If you do not commit adultery but do kill, you have become a transgressor of

[39] Strack-Billerbeck, op. cit., I 811; J. Jeremias in ZNW 36 (1937), 210 f.
[40] See W. L. Knox in JTS 46 (1945), 10–17, on its sources.

the Law" (James ii. 8–11). Similarly rabbinic Judaism held that to break one commandment was to break all.[41] In the community which preserved James' halakoth Christianity is essentially observance of the "royal" Law, and the Decalogue is certainly to be kept in force. To curse a brother is to curse the Law and to presume to judge it; a man cannot presume to be judge; there is one judge, the master of salvation and condemnation (James iv. 11–12). The Law is above human presumption. There is little here with which Paul could not have agreed, though his emphasis would have been different.[42]

We have seen that in the New Testament there is considerable justification for considering the Decalogue a higher form of Law than the local or national legislation of the rest of the Pentateuch. Now we shall examine the way in which this distinction came to be precisely formulated in the course of the second century. A catechetical work of the early second century, known as the De Doctrina Apostolorum,[43] describes the "way of life" as consisting of love of God and love of neighbor and observance of the "Golden Rule"; these words (the equivalent of the first table of the Decalogue) are then "interpreted." The interpretation begins (lines 15–34) with the commandments of the second table, glossed in order to provide a practical code. Very similarly the second chapter of "the much belabored Didache," [44] probably following the Doctrina, interprets the Decalogue. In the longer version of the Didache (i. 3–ii. 1) there is a collection of maxims largely taken from the Sermon on the Mount and often justified on prudential grounds. "Love those who hate you — and you will have no enemy" (i. 3). "If anyone takes what is yours, do not demand it back — for you are not able to do so" (i. 4). Similarly the author quotes an agraphon on the subject of almsgiving in order to check the enthusiasm of "Give to everyone who asks of you": "Let your alms sweat into your hands until you know to whom you are giving" (i. 6). At the end of the two ways the practical note is sounded again: "If you can bear the whole yoke of the Lord

[41] J. Marty, L'épître de Jacques (Paris, 1935), 84 f.

[42] See M. S. Enslin, The Ethics of Paul (New York, 1930), 67 f.

[43] On this work see E. J. Goodspeed in ATR 27 (1945), 228–47.

[44] See F. E. Vokes, The Riddle of the Didache (London, 1938); J. M. Creed in JTS 39 (1938), 370–87.

(Matthew xi. 30), you will be perfect; but if you cannot, do what you can" (vi. 2). The legalism of the Didache is pedestrian. It reflects the attempt to synthesize the Law of the revelation on Sinai with the "law" of Christ on the Galilean mountain; and its author tries to provide a "fence" for this law — to be sure, a rather low one.[45]

A somewhat more imaginative analysis of the difference between the Old Testament Law and Christian teaching is to be found in the epistle of Barnabas.[46] His theme, that Jewish disobedience to the Law made it irrelevant to them, is foreshadowed in the speech assigned to the martyr Stephen in Acts vii. 2–53. Moses received the "living oracles" from the angel who spoke to him on Sinai, but the fathers disobeyed them immediately, by making a calf and offering sacrifice to it. Hence "God turned and gave them over to worship the host of heaven" (38–42).[47] They had broken the first and second commandments.[48] This theme is developed in Barnabas iv. 8: "But they turned to idols and lost it (the Decalogue). For thus says the Lord: 'Moses, Moses, go down quickly, for your people whom you brought out of the land of Egypt has broken the Law' (Exodus xxxii. 7 — Deuteronomy ix. 12). And Moses understood and cast the two tables out of his hands, and their covenant was broken, in order that the covenant of the beloved Jesus might be sealed in our hearts in hope of his faith."[49] The irrelevance of the Sabbath legislation to Jews is worked out in Barnabas xv, where the fourth commandment is interpreted in the light of Genesis ii. 2 (the Sabbath rest of God), a saying which has not yet been fulfilled, since God is still at work.[50] Moreover no one has the clean hands and heart with which

[45] Its relation to Judaism: G. Klein, Der älteste christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propaganda-Literatur (Berlin, 1909), 184–238; the concept of "fence": Pirke Aboth i. 1 (p. 11 Taylor), iii. 20 (p. 54 f.).

[46] See P. Meinhold in ZKG 59 (1940), 255–303; H. Windisch, Der Barnabasbrief (Tübingen, 1920), 315 f.

[47] On this see F. J. F. Jackson–K. Lake–H. J. Cadbury, The Beginnings of Christianity IV (London, 1933), 79.

[48] See John vii. 19.

[49] The idols which Barnabas has in mind include not only the calf but also the serpent (Numbers xxi. 9) which Moses made as a type of Jesus (Barnabas xii. 6; see John iii. 14f.).

[50] See John v. 17 f.; and note that Genesis is regarded as prophecy. When the legal part of the Old Testament was restricted to the Decalogue and the rest was searched for types, that remainder could be classified only as prophetic.

to sanctify it.[51] Therefore, since Sabbaths cannot be kept, we keep the eighth day, "which is the beginning of another world." No emphasis is laid on the commandments of the second table, though some of them (and the fourth commandment as well) are paraphrased or quoted in Barnabas xix. 4–6.

In the Doctrina, Didache, and epistle of Barnabas, the Decalogue was interpreted for practical use by Christians. A different situation is to be found in the "mandates" of the Shepherd of Hermas. The twelve commandments which Hermas sets forth are badly arranged (though the first and the last are approximately the same as the first and tenth commandments of the Decalogue), diffuse, and of very uneven merit. In brief, they are as follows: I. "First of all, believe that there is one God" [52] and practise faith, fear, and continence. II. Keep singleness (sincerity) and be innocent. III. Love truth. IV. Keep purity — by repentance and avoidance of a second marriage. V. Be long-suffering and understanding. VI. (Explanation of the faith, fear, and continence required by the first commandment.) VII. "Fear the Lord and keep his commandments" (Ecclesiastes xii. 13). VIII. Avoid evil and do not do it; do not avoid good, but do it (examples are given). IX. Remove double-mindedness from yourself. X. Remove grief from yourself, for this is the sister of double-mindedness and bitterness. XI. Tests of the true and false prophet or teacher. XII. Remove every evil desire from yourself, but put on the good and holy desire. Hardly anything in these twelve commandments is specifically Christian except the actual problems involved — divorce and remarriage (iv. 1), post-baptismal sin (iv. 3), second marriages (iv. 4), false prophets (xi). The teaching is almost entirely Jewish; the "evil desire" and "good and holy desire," for example, are presumably the evil and good "impulse" of rabbinic thought.[53] Much of the ethical commonplace of Hermas can be paralleled in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.

But why did Hermas compile his twelve commandments?

[51] Isaiah i. 13.

[52] This was greatly admired in the ancient church: Irenaeus, Adv. haer. iv. 20. 2 (II, 213 f. Harvey), Epid. 4 (p. 3 f. Harnack); Origen, De principiis i. 3. 3; Athanasius, De incarnatione verbi iii. 1.

[53] See note 21 above; not Stoic, as against M. Dibelius, Der Hirt des Hermas (Tübingen, 1923), 544.

Dibelius' answer,[54] "to awaken repentance among sinners in the church and to give penitents instruction for the new life," is certainly true as far as it goes; but why not simply use the Decalogue? Goodspeed's remark,[55] "It is characteristic of the free spirit of the early Christian prophets that Hermas is not deterred by the Jewish Ten Commandments from offering twelve more," hardly provides a complete solution. It is interesting to observe that while the Manichees had ten commandments (F. C. Burkitt, The Religion of the Manichees [Cambridge, 1925], 61), their content is strikingly similar to that of the commandments of Hermas; and an attempt is sometimes made to divide them into groups of three: a feat more easily accomplished with twelve than with ten. Moreover a leaf from the Shepherd has been found among the Turfan fragments (ibid., 96). Another point worth considering is the source of Hermas' idea of having twelve commandments. Professor F. W. Buckler suggests to me that since he wrote in Rome he could not have failed to be influenced by the traditional Laws of the XII Tables. It may perhaps be suggested that in the Roman community for which Hermas wrote the whole Jewish Law was in disrepute. Even the Decalogue had fallen out of use among Christians. In confirmation of this hypothesis two facts may be mentioned. The Roman church had great difficulty in excommunicating Cerdo, who rejected the Old Testament; [56] and Marcion of Pontus, who held similar views, clearly expected to find a favorable reception in the Roman community.[57]

In the region from which Marcion came, however, traces of the Decalogue can be found in what looks like systematic ethical instruction. No doubt it was in reaction against such "Judaizing" that he turned to "Paulinism," placing the somewhat antinomian Galatians at the head of his canon of Pauline epistles. In any event, through the official language of Pliny's report to the emperor Trajan in the last months of the year 112 [58] there can be seen the main outlines of the baptismal oath taken by Christian con-

[54] M. Dibelius, op. cit., 424.

[55] E. J. Goodspeed, A History of Early Christian Literature (Chicago, 1942), 48.

[56] Irenaeus, Adv. haer. iii. 4. 2 (II, 17).

[57] A. v. Harnack, Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott (ed. 2, Leipzig, 1924), 25 f.; J. Knox, Marcion and the New Testament (Chicago, 1942), 12.

[58] U. Wilcken in Hermes 49 (1914), 120–36.

verts.[59] "They bind themselves with an oath . . . not to commit thefts, robberies, or adulteries, not to perjure themselves, nor to refuse, when called upon, to return a deposit." [60] This looks very much like a Christian reinterpretation, like that in Mark x. 19 or Didache ii, of the last five commandments of the Decalogue.

A very similar interpretation of the Decalogue is set forth in a description of ideal Christian life by the nearly contemporary apologist Aristides.[61] "They have the commandments of the Lord Jesus Christ engraved in their hearts, and they keep them, expecting a resurrection of the dead and life in the age to come. They do not commit adultery, they do not commit fornication, they do not bear false witness, they do not retain a deposit, they do not covet the possessions of others, they honor father and mother and love their neighbors, they judge just judgments.[62] . . . Whatever they do not wish to be done to them they do not do to another."

In the work of a later apologist, Justin, who writes at Rome, we find no explicit use of the Decalogue, although he makes collections of sayings on particular virtues, such as "On not swearing at all," "That God alone must be worshiped," "On temperance," "On love of all." Some of these, of course, may have come to him from the teaching tradition of the Christian school.[63] Does his failure to use the Decalogue reflect the same tradition, that of Rome in the mid-second century? In his Dialogue with Trypho, possibly reflecting his teaching at Ephesus,[64] he refers to "a certain commandment ordained for the service of God and righteous behavior" (Dial. 44); this is obviously the Decalogue.

But not until the time of the Valentinian Ptolemaeus do we find any real theological analysis of the meaning of the Old Testament Law as reinterpreted in the life of the Christian church. In his letter to Flora, Ptolemaeus acutely synthesizes the sayings of

[59] C. J. Kraemer, Jr., in CP 29 (1934), 293–300; C. C. Coulton in CP 35 (1940), 60–63. Compare A. D. Nock in CR 38 (1924), 58 f.

[60] Pliny, Ep. x. 96. 7 (p. 309 Kukula).

[61] Aristides, Apol. xv. 3–5 (p. 24 Geffcken; see also pp. 87 f.).

[62] Doubtless a summary of the "judgements" of Exodus xxi–xxiii; see note 69 below.

[63] Justin, Apol. i. 14–17 (see 61. 2); W. Bousset, Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom (Göttingen, 1915), 282–308.

[64] Eusebius, HE iv. 18. 6, states (from the lost preface to the Dialogue?) that the discussion was held at Ephesus; but the Dialogue was obviously written after the first apology; compare Dial. 120 with Apol. 1.26.

Jesus as found in the gospel of Matthew with the varying levels of inspiration of the Old Testament. Part of the Law is from God, part from Moses (Matthew xix. 8, 6), and part from the elders (Matthew xv. 4–9). Again, the Law may be divided into pure legislation (Matthew v. 17), a part mixed with evil (Matthew v. 38), and a purely typical or symbolical part (I Corinthians v. 7). The example Ptolemaeus gives of pure legislation, the "Law of God," is the Decalogue, "those ten words divided into two tables, for the forbidding of things not to be done and the injunction of things to be done. And yet, though they have pure legislation, they did not reach perfection, and they needed the fulfilment which the Saviour gave." [65] The Decalogue has its place in Christian ethics, even though its place is not the highest. It is to be interpreted (as in Matthew v. 17–48) in the light of the sayings of Jesus. From the time of Ptolemaeus (although he was rejected as a heretic [66]) we no longer find "double-mindedness" over the Decalogue, at least within the Christian church.

Naturally in the case of a Christian instructed by Jewish Teachers the Decalogue is highly valued. Theophilus of Antioch owes almost all his Old Testament exegesis to his rabbinical instructors.[67] And yet, while he praises the Decalogue grandly, calling it "ten headings of the great and marvelous Law which serves for all righteousness," and arranges it under three titles, "On piety," "On well-doing," and "On righteousness," when we come to examine it more closely we find that he has quietly altered its contents. "Piety" consists of the first two commandments; "well-doing" consists of the fifth; and "righteousness" consists of the sixth through tenth and, in addition, two (or three) "judgements" of Exodus xxiii. 6–8. The third and fourth commandments are simply omitted.[68] This high valuation of the "judgements" reminds us of the third-century Syrian Didascalia Apostolorum, in which the

[65] Epiphanius, Haer, xxxiii. 5. 3 (I, 454 Holl.).

[66] Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I praef. (I, 5). An example of semi-Christian ridicule of the Decalogue is to be found in Epiphanes, De justitia, in Clement, Strom. iii. 9 (W. Völker, Quellen zur Geschichte der christlichen Gnosis [Tübingen, 1932], 35). God gave desire; how could he forbid it?

[67] A. Marmorstein in The Expositor, Eighth Series, 17 (1919), 104–109; also discussed in my dissertation Studies in Theophilus of Antioch (1944, unpublished), 147–57.

[68] Ad Autolycum III 9 (p. 214 Otto).

Law is defined as "the Decalogue and the judgements, which the Lord spoke before the people made a calf and committed idolatry." [69] The freedom with which Theophilus handles the Decalogue cannot be entirely explained in the light of such a parallel. In part it arises from the earlier Christian practice of rephrasing the Decalogue. Furthermore, Theophilus has a very literal mind, and he lays great emphasis on the Law of God. While it is not right to mention God vainly,[70] no one really knows God's name,[71] and to forbid the mention of it must have seemed pointless. Again, the Sabbath did not need to be kept holy since Christians observed Sunday. The second table, however, was still in force, as well as part of the first; Theophilus explains the meaning of a pure soul, required in order to see God (Matthew v. 8), in terms of the fifth through ninth or tenth commandments.[72]

In Irenaeus, the first theologian of the Catholic church, something like the theory of Ptolemaeus becomes orthodox. By a severely literal interpretation of John v. 46–47 he proves that the writings of Moses are words of Christ,[73] but goes on to point out that "as the Law began from Moses, later it ended in John, and Christ came to fulfill it." [74] The Decalogue, however, was not Mosaic. "When God first admonished them through the natural precepts, which he had given men from the beginning within them — that is, through the Decalogue, disobedience to which deprives one of salvation — he asked of them nothing more. As Moses says in Deuteronomy (v. 22): 'These are all the words which the Lord spoke to the whole congregation of the children of Israel on the mountain, and he added nothing, and he wrote them on two tables of stone; and he gave them to me' — in order that those who desire to follow him might keep the precepts." [75] The patriarchs did not have the Decalogue because the "power of the Decalogue (virtus decalogi) was written in their hearts and souls." [76] The

[69] Didascalia 26 (p. 219 Connolly).
[70] Ad Autolycum II 10 (p. 82); T. Zahn, Forschungen zur Geschichte des N. T. Kanons II (Erlangen, 1883), 145.
[71] Ad Autolycum I 3 (pp. 10–12).
[72] Ibid. I 2 (p. 8).
[73] Irenaeus, Adv. haer. iv. 2. 3 (II, 148).
[74] Ibid. iv. 4. 1 (II, 152).
[75] Ibid. iv. 15. 1 (II, 186).
[76] Ibid. iv. 16. 2 (II, 190).

purpose of the Decalogue was through love of God and justice toward neighbor to bring a man into friendship with God and concord with neighbor.[77] The Lord gave it extension and development, not dissolution, and therefore they are permanent among us.[78]

Similarly in Irenaeus' Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching there is a vigorous emphasis on the goodness of the Law; but there is a more explicit recognition of the fact that in the teaching of Christ it has been transcended. The Law itself proves that "men are to live not according to the verbosity of the Law, but according to the brevity of faith and love."[79] When we have entered the Christian community, "after life has been given us now through this calling, we should no longer turn back to the first law-giving. For we have received the Lord of the Law, the Son of God. And through faith we learn to love God with our whole heart and our neighbor as ourself. But the love of God is far from all sins[80] and the love of neighbor adds no evil to a neighbor. Therefore we have no law requiring a teacher; behold, we speak with the Father and stand before him face to face, having become children in regard to evil and mature in righteousness and constancy.[81] For the Law will no longer say, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' to one into whose mind lust for another's wife no longer comes; nor 'Thou shalt not kill,' to one who has removed from himself all anger and hostility. . . ."[82] To say this is not to deny the need for the Decalogue at an earlier stage of Christian education. But when maturity comes, the Decalogue is to be replaced by the Sermon on the Mount. Irenaeus sets forth the relation of the Decalogue to the Sermon in a synthesis of Pauline thought and traditional second-century Catholicism.[83]

The same pattern of catechetical instruction is to be found at

[77] Ibid. iv. 16. 3 (II, 191).

[78] Ibid. iv. 16. 4 (II, 192).

[79] Epideixis 87 (p. 45 Harnack).

[80] A quotation from Polycarp (Phil. iii. 3); J. R. Harris, Testimonies I (Cambridge, 1916), 66.

[81] See I Corinthians xiv. 20.

[82] Epideixis 95–96 (p. 49 Harnack); see Adv. haer. iv. 15–16 passim; F. R. M. Hitchcock, Irenaeus of Lugdunum (Cambridge, 1914), 55–58.

[83] On Irenaeus' "Paulinism" see J. Werner, Der Paulinismus des Irenaeus (Leipzig, 1889). His statement (p. 218) that Irenaeus' standpoint reflects "not Golgotha but Rome" is one-sided.

Alexandria. In Clement's more elementary Paedagogos (iii. 89) he observes that the Decalogue was proclaimed openly to the people, "not through enigmas"; in other words, it did not require allegorization.[84] But when we come to the Stromateis (vi. 133–148), written for the more advanced pupil, Clement explains practically all of it symbolically. The ten words signify Jesus, because of the letter iota (145). Honor of father and mother means honor of God and — "not, as some say, the substance from which we came into existence, nor, as others have set forth, the church" [85] — divine knowledge and wisdom, the "mother of the righteous," a reference to Proverbs i. 8. Adultery means leaving the ecclesiastical and true knowledge for vain opinion (146). Murder is destruction of true knowledge. Theft is imitation of the true philosophy (147). False witness is assigning power to the stars instead of to their creator. And the "word concerning all desires" shows that God will supply the remedy for their cure (148). Clement would agree with Irenaeus that the mature Christian does not need the Decalogue. Unlike Irenaeus, he would make use of it to prove the divine origin of Christian gnosticism.[85a]

In conclusion, we may observe that the way in which the early church was able to systematize use of the Decalogue and provide a theological basis for its retention by gentiles was by extensive use of the idea that the law of nature and the Law of God were essentially the same. This concept was taken from Hellenistic Judaism [86] by Paul. "For Paul the Mosaic Law is the most complete revelation of the will of God there is, in terms of precepts and prohibitions; but the 'law of nature' is not a different law, but only a less precise and complete revelation of the same eternal and complete law of right and wrong." [87] By means of a careful and literal exegesis of the context of the Decalogue early Christian

[84] Similarly in Origen's treatise on allegorization (De Principiis IV) he gives some of the commandments and their interpretations in the Sermon on the Mount as examples of passages to be taken literally (Philocalia i. 19, p. 27 Robinson).

[85] See J. C. Plumpe, Mater Ecclesia (Washington, 1943), 68 f.

[85a] Stählin's notes (GCS edition, II 499–508) show how much Clement owes to Aristobulus and Philo; see also P. Heinisch, Der Einfluss Philos auf die älteste christliche Exegese (Münster, 1908), 273–77.

[86] Testament of Naphthali iii. 2 (p. 149); Sirach xvi. 26–28; J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus II (London–Edinburgh, 1888), 166–69; C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks (London, 1935), 25–41.

[87] C. H. Dodd, Romans (London–New York, 1932), 36.

interpreters were able to show that it was only the Decalogue which God had spoken, and that the rest of the Law had been added for various reasons. The Decalogue provided an extremely valuable means of catechetical instruction, as it does today. And yet it was realized that Jesus not only summed it up but went beyond it. But since he went beyond it only to reenforce it, Christians did not feel free either to reject the Decalogue or to call his interpretation impossible of fulfilment. Instead, they recognized the existence of catechumens and of mature Christians as well, and expected progress in the practice of religion.

ANTIOCHENE EXEGESIS IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

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THE OUTSTANDING importance of allegorical interpretation to the medieval scholar engaged on interpreting the Scriptures is well known. The method, which had originated in the East and was older than Christianity, became well established in the West during the Patristic age; in its application there was a good deal of variety. Ambrosiaster in commenting on the Pauline epistles combined orthodoxy with an unswerving adherence to the historical sense. Tyconius, on the other hand, laid down no less than seven rules whereby to interpret the prophecies in the Old Testament. Augustine went further in finding allegorical meaning in passages of Holy Writ than Jerome, who always maintained a certain balance in expounding the literal and the spiritual sense. The latter is more pronounced in his earlier commentaries when he was still consciously under the influence of Origen. In his later works allegorical interpretation becomes noticeably less; but it is not wholly absent even from his unfinished commentary on Jeremiah.[1] To Gregory the Great the *sensus spiritalis* and particularly the *sensus moralis* were of such paramount significance as almost to oust the literal meaning. His influence on Bede and through Bede, as well as directly, on later expounders of the Bible was enormous.

Ambrosiaster's commentary, in spite of his avoidance of allegory, in one form or another was widely used in the Middle Ages, as the large number of extant manuscripts as well as citations in later authors make abundantly clear.[2] The emphasis on the literal sense was, however, characteristic above all of the Antiochene school of commentators, Diodorus of Tarsus and his pupils,

[1] The assertion of Miss Beryl Smalley (The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, p. 8), that the commentary on Jeremiah was "purely literal," does not correspond to the facts. Cf., for instance, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum latinorum 59, p. 25, 16–18 (iuxta litteram . . . iuxta intellegentiam spiritalem); p. 40, 19–22 (iuxta ἀναγωγὴν); p. 43, 6–10 (secundum ἀναγωγὴν).

[2] See the list of manuscripts in A. Souter, The earliest Latin commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul, pp. 56–59.

Theodore of Mopsuestia and John Chrysostom. Of Diodorus' expositions it is difficult to judge, since his writings have disappeared and the number of fragments or quotations in other authors is small. Much more is known of Theodore's teaching and doctrinal views, especially since several of his treatises in Syriac versions have been recovered and published by the late Alphonse Mingana.[3] The influence of John Chrysostom in the West through the medium of Latin translations of his homilies and other works needs no further comment, as the subject has been well treated by Baur and Wilmart.[4] And besides, Chrysostom, though an Antiochene, was no out-and-out literalist nor did his views on fundamental questions lapse from orthodoxy. The case was quite different with Theodore. The heterodoxy of much that he taught, although it did not weaken his authority among the Nestorian Christians, brought about the condemnation and official destruction of his writings in 553 at the Fifth Oecumenical Council. His strict adherence to the historic sense would not seriously have impaired his credit any more than it harmed Ambrosiaster's though one must admit that the popularity of that book was greatly helped by its attribution to Ambrose. But Theodore questioned the dogma of predestination,[5] while his Christology was to earn him the reputation of father or forerunner of Nestorianism. His exclusion, moreover, of certain Biblical books from the canon, though of minor significance in his own day, subsequently ran counter to the official ruling of the Church in the West. Such influence as he was to exert in the Latin-speaking world came directly through two of his works of which translations became available, indirectly through the little treatise composed by Junilius in the middle of the sixth century.[6]

[3] A. Mingana, The commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Nicene Creed (Woodbrooke Studies 5, 1932), and The commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Lord's prayer and on the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist (Woodbrooke Studies 6, 1933).

[4] Chr. Baur, S. Jean Chrysostome et ses oeuvres dans l'histoire littéraire; A. Wilmart in Journ. Theol. Stud. 19 (1918), pp. 311 ff. For a palimpsest of Mutianus' translation of Chrysostom on the epistle to the Hebrews see E. A. Lowe, C(odices) L(atini) A(ntiquiores) II, nos. 180–181, and Journ. Theol. Stud. 29 (1927), pp. 29–33.

[5] For his remarkably lenient views on the fate of unbaptized infants see Bulletin of the J. Rylands library 5 (1918–20), pp. 311–312.

[6] Miss Smalley (op. cit., p. 7), in referring to the influence of the Antiochenes in

A commentary on the Psalms was perhaps Theodore's earliest work, and of this a Latin version must have reached Ireland at a comparatively early date. Portions of it survive in a manuscript at Milan (Ambros. C 301 inf.). It seems to have been written in Ireland and has long been familiar to students of Old-Irish because of the glosses in that language that it contains. There are also some fragments of another codex in Turin (Bibl. naz. F.IV.1, fasc. 5–6). The Ambrosian manuscript contains two distinct works, portions of Theodore on the Psalms and a commentary on the same book which used to be attributed to Columban but more recently has been claimed with much probability for Julian of Aeclanum.[7] Another of Theodore's exegetical works was a commentary on the Pauline epistles. The Greek original is lost save for occasional quotations in *catenae*. But a Latin version survives in two manuscripts which were used by H. B. Swete for his admirable edition.[8] Both codices come from the same monastic library, namely Corbie. One (British Museum, Harley 3063) indeed is written in the characteristic, so called Corbie ab-script, which was in use in that monastery and in other neighboring scriptoria at the end of the eighth and the opening of the ninth century.[9] The other codex (Amiens 88) was copied a decade or two later and is in an early Carolingian hand. In addition to these

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the West, mentions only Chrysostom and Junilius. Later (p. 22) there is a passing reference to Theodore's commentary on the Psalter, but that on the Pauline epistles, though far more influential, is ignored.

[7] For the manuscript see E. A. Lowe, CLA III, no. 326, and especially the facsimile of the codex published by R. I. Best, The Commentary on the Psalms with glosses in Old-Irish preserved in the Ambrosian Library (R. Irish Academy, 1936). The contents of the manuscript have produced much controversial literature. For this see particularly Best's Introduction and the long article by R. Devreesse, Revue biblique 37 (1928), pp. 340–366 and 38 (1929), pp. 35–62, where full references to the earlier literature are provided. I have not yet seen Mgr. Devreesse's edition of the commentary in Studi e Testi 93 (1939); but cf. the reviews by Dom David Amand in Revue bénédictine 53 (1941), pp. 182–183 and by J. Lebon in Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 36 (1940), pp. 408–410. What other manuscripts of the commentary may have existed in the Middle Ages I do not know; but one would like to know what the book was which is listed as being in the library of St. Maximin at Trier in the eleventh or twelfth century, *expositio psalterii scottice conscripta* (G. Becker, Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui 76, 151).

[8] H. B. Swete, Theodore of Mopsuestia on the minor epistles of St. Paul (Two vols.: Cambridge, Eng., 1880).

[9] As E. A. Lowe has rightly pointed out (Palaeographia latina V, p. 45), the term, Corbie ab-script, is not wholly satisfactory, since this form of writing was practised also in St. Riquier, Arras, Soissons, and some other scriptoria.

two manuscripts there survive ten folios of a codex unknown to Swete and written in an Anglo-Saxon script of the end of the eighth century (Parisinus lat. 17177, foll. 5–12 + Vaticanus lat. 340). The bifolium in the Vatican Library formed the fly-leaf of a manuscript containing Jerome's commentary on Galatians, which was also originally at Corbie. The loss of this manuscript of Theodore is greatly to be deplored; for its text seems to be superior to the two used by Swete (*H* and *C*).[10] Another codex, presumably complete, of the commentary exists or existed in an unknown private collection.[11] The use of at least a part of Theodore's commentary on the Pauline epistles was far more extensive in Western Europe than the survival of three manuscripts and a fragment of a fourth would suggest. The really notable fact is that a series of scholars from the ninth century to the twelfth cite passages from Theodore without being aware of the author's identity. Perhaps as early as the later sixth century, as it would seem, imperfect manuscripts of Ambrosiaster's commentary were completed by adding other anonymous commentaries to it. Amongst these was Theodore's, and the surviving manuscripts (Amiens 87 and 88; Harley 3063) are extant examples of this conflation. A codex of this type was used by Amalarius of Metz, Sedulius Scottus, and Hrabanus Maurus in the ninth century, and by Lanfranc and Ivo of Chartres in the eleventh. Finally Swete drew attention to the compilation on the Pauline epistles put together by Robert of Bridlington. His citations from "Ambrose" come partly from Ambrosiaster, partly from Theodore; but as they agree closely with the quotations from the same work given by Lanfranc, it is quite likely that Robert obtained them at second hand. All these writers when they cite their authority by name call him "Ambrose." But for this false attribution Theodore's book would doubtless not have been consulted and quoted without question by medieval scholars of unimpeachable orthodoxy; in-

[10] See D. de Bruyne in Revue bénédictine 33 (1921), p. 52, and 47 (1935), p. 305; E. A. Lowe, CLA I, no. 4. De Bruyne when studying the Paris fragment noted that its text was superior to that of *H* and *C*. On the photograph illustrating the Vaticanus in CLA I the last word but one is *athleticae*. This is the true reading (*ad letae C; ad letitiae H*). Swete in his text read *athleticiae* but conjectured that *athleticae* might be the true reading. Cf. Swete, op. cit., II, p. 204, line 10 with note.

[11] Ibid. I, xv with note 6; A. Souter, Earliest Latin Commentaries, p. 53.

deed, the Latin translation might well have been suppressed in the West as the original had been long before in the East. Similarly the survival of Pelagius' commentary was due to the fact that the book circulated under the venerated name of Jerome.[12] It may nevertheless be admitted that on the existing evidence it would seem that Theodore's two commentaries circulated in a relatively restricted geographical area. Indirectly some of his teaching became more widely known through the manual of Junilius to which we must now turn our attention.[13]

Probably in 551 Junilius, a native of Africa who held the office of Quaestor of the Sacred Palace in Constantinople, at the request of Primasius, bishop of Hadrumetum, compiled his Instituta regularia divinae legis. It was a Latin version of a short introduction to the study of the Bible put together by Paul the Persian, whom Junilius had met and with whom he had conversed in Constantinople. Although the Instituta were first printed in 1545 and then frequently reprinted, no adequate edition of them became available until 1880. In that year Heinrich Kihn brought out an exhaustive monograph on the teaching of Theodore and of Junilius and appended to it a new recension of the Instituta based on the collation of thirteen manuscripts. With reference to Junilius' subsequent influence in the West Kihn observed:

> Von der reichen Literatur der nestorianischen Kirche ist in neurer Zeit aus syrischen Quellen mancher Schatz erhoben worden; aber einflussreicher und wichtiger als alle diese Publika-

[12] For the medieval authors who quote Theodore see generally Swete, op. cit. I, pp. xliv–li and II, 346–8; Souter, op. cit., pp. 52–53. On Sedulius Scottus' Collectaneum consult Souter in Journ. Theol. Stud. 18 (1916–17), pp. 226 ff. On Robert of Bridlington cf. Swete, op. cit. I, p. xxviii.

[13] The suggestion originally put forward by Neander that the Adoptionists in eighth-century Spain were influenced in their Christology by Nestorianism and by the writings of Theodore has gained a good deal of currency largely because it was accepted by Harnack (Dogmengeschichte III, p. 253). The question had already been discussed cautiously by Swete (op. cit. I, pp. lv–lvii), and the possible connection between the teaching of Elipandus and Felix of Urgel and Nestorianism, but without mention of Theodore, is discussed by M. Menendez Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos españoles II (ed. 2, 1911), pp. 317–318; cf. also Z. García Villada, Historia eclesiástica de España III (1936), p. 69, and particularly A. Hauck, Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands II (ed. 3–4, 1912), p. 304, note 4, who calls the derivation of Adoptionism from Nestorianism "more than questionable." Recently J. Quasten (Harvard Theol. Rev. 35 [1942], pp. 209–219) has drawn attention to the baptismal rite of the *cilicium* in the Eastern Church. It is mentioned by Theodore, was already known to exist in Africa, and, as we learn from Ildefonsus of Toledo,

tionen ist die Schrift des Junilius, weil sie im Mittelalter in der abendländischen Kirche neben den Lehrbüchern Cassiodors als Schulbuch fleissig benützt worden ist, wie schon die verhältnissmässig grosse Zahl der erhaltenen Handschriften beweist.[14]

Although Kihn's book as a whole is a fine piece of scholarship and his text of the Instituta is vastly superior to those previously available, his estimate of Junilius' subsequent influence deserves reconsideration in the light of additional evidence and his text also raises some interesting questions. In the first place the extant manuscripts are almost twice as numerous as Kihn believed. A more complete list is here appended. The manuscripts used by Kihn have been distinguished by an asterisk and the sigla employed by him to designate the individual codices have been added after the press-mark:

Avranches 109. saec. xi, Mont St Michel.
Catalogue général X, p. 51.

Bruges 86, foll. 90ra–99vb. saec. xv.
A. De Poorter, Catalogue des MSS de la bibliothèque de la ville de Bruges, pp. 100–101.

*Florence, Bibl. Laurenz., S. Marci 38 (*L*). saec. ix.

*Florence, Bibl. Laurenz., S. Mariae Novellae 364 (*N*). saec. x–xi.

*Florence, Bibl. Laurenz., Plut. XX.54 (*F*). saec. xi.
According to Kihn *N* and *F* are closely related, but one is not a copy of the other.

Karlsruhe, Aug. XVIII, fol. 65v. saec. ix in., Reichenau.
A. Holder, Die Reichenauer Handschriften I, p. 66; C. H. Beeson, Isidorstudien, p. 96. The manuscript contains a collection of creeds and definitions of the Trinity which Karl Künstle (Forschungen z. christlichen Litteratur und Dogmengeschichte I, 4 [1900]) believed to have been put together originally in Spain to combat Arianism in the West. The extract from Junilius is from Inst. I, 13–20.

Karlsruhe, Aug. CXI, foll. 66v–72v. saec. ix in., Reichenau.
Holder, op. cit. I, p. 287; Beeson, op. cit., p. 30. Again the codex

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was observed in Spain. Quasten is doubtless correct in assuming that this liturgical practice came from the East to Spain via Africa. But there is of course nothing which would suggest that the Spanish Church became familiar with the rite through the writings of Theodore, so that the survival, though interesting in itself, affords no support to Neander's theory.

[14] H. Kihn, Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten, p. 212; cf. also p. 315. Similarly Bardenhewer (Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur V, p. 336) couples the names of Junilius and Cassiodorus as authors of schoolbooks.

contains only a fragment of Book I, which is immediately preceded by Eucherius.

Laon 463.5. saec. xii, St Vincent.

Catalogue général (in-quarto) I, pp. 246–247. Book I, chapter 1 and part of 2 only.

London, B.M. Cotton Tib. A.XV, foll. 175–180. saec. viii in., S. England.

E. A. Lowe, CLA II, no. 189, who points out that the hand is similar to that found in a charter of A.D. 705. The six folios contain portions of Book I.

*Milan, Ambros. I.1 sup. saec. viii–ix, N. Italian.

E. A. Lowe, CLA III, no. 348. From Bobbio. Textually this is the best of Kihn's manuscripts.

Monte Cassino 29, pp. 129–133. saec. x–xi.

M. Inguanez, Codicum casinensium manu scriptorum catalogus I, pp. 36–40. Extracts from both books of the Instituta. The same codex contains Bede's commentary on Proverbs and his Quaestiones XXX, but was unfortunately omitted from my Hand-list of Bede MSS (Ithaca, N. Y., 1943).

*Munich 14276, foll. 1–4. (*E*) saec. ix, St Emmeram.

Preface and *tituli* to Book I only. According to Kihn they are copied from the same exemplar as Clm 14645 and 14854.

*Munich 14423, foll. 25r–28v. (*M*) saec. viii^2, St Emmeram.

Book I only, written in Anglo-Saxon script.

*Munich 14469, foll. 150v–153v. (*C*) saec. ix^2, St Emmeram.

Book I, 1–10 without the preface.

*Munich 14645, foll. 1–44 (*B*) saec. ix^1, St Emmeram.

Complete save for the preface and *tituli* to Book I.

*Munich 14854, Foll. 1–110. (*D*) saec. ix^2, St Emmeram.

According to Kihn this codex is copied from the same exemplar as Clm 14645. The dates given for these five *Monacenses* are Kihn's and may need revision in the light of the more accurate palaeographical knowledge of our day.

*Paris, B.N. 1750, foll. 29r–40v. (*P*) saec. x.

Kihn states that this is a copy of *L*.

*Paris, B.N. 17371, foll. 180v–194r. (*R*) saec. xi, Notre Dame.

*St Gall 130, pp. 137–190. (*H*) saec. ix^2, St Gall.

The date is given by A. Bruckner, Scriptoria medii aevi helvetica II, 1, p. 65.

*St Gall 908 (*G*). saec. viii^1?

A palimpsest. Six folios survive containing parts of both Books.

Kihn, following Scherrer, dated the primary script in the sixth century, but this is far too early. W. M. Lindsay (Notae latinae, p. 485) says "saec. viii," Lowe in Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle (Studi e Testi 40), p. 59, assigns the primary script to the early eighth century.

Valenciennes 95. saec. ix, St Amand.

Catalogue général XXV, p. 227. The same manuscript contains Eucherius' Instructiones, but the manuscript was not used by Wotke for his edition in the Vienna Corpus.

Vatican City, Regin. lat. 76, foll. 9v–16r. circa A.D. 800, N. French.

A. Wilmart, Catalogus codicum reginensium I, p. 169. The manuscript contains collected passages from the Fathers, the passages from Junilius being much abbreviated.

Wolfenbüttel, Helmstedt 532, foll. 122–134v. saec. ix, Salzburg?

O. von Heinemann, Die Handschriften der herzoglichen Bibliothek zu Wolfenbüttel I, 2, p. 21. Heinemann's dating is not always reliable, but the ninth-century date and Salzburg as the possible "Schriftheimat" are confirmed by C. H. Beeson, Isidorstudien, p. 31.

Several interesting points are suggested by this list of manuscripts. As Kihn's date for Sangallensis 908 is far too early, it is probable that not these fragments but the six folios of the Cottonian manuscript are the earliest fragments of a Junilius manuscript that we possess. What was the relation of the Cotton codex to the manuscript used by Aldhelm, who cites a passage from Junilius' letter to Primasius in his De metris? [15] The late M. R. James hazarded a brilliant guess when he suggested that Aldhelm's manuscript was the same that was seen many centuries later at Malmesbury by Leland. At the same time he pointed out that Glastonbury Abbey owned an ancient manuscript of our author (Lib. Iunilii vetust.). James' surmise was based on the fact that in Leland's manuscript Primasius was called *papa*, while the same mistake appears in Aldhelm who wrote: "Hoc itidem Iunillius instituta regularia, quae a Paulo Persa Sirorum scolis naviter instructo didicerat, Primasio, sedis apostolicae pontifici, scribens . . ." But James overlooked an important fact, the six folios from a codex of Junilius which now form a part of the Cottonian manuscript. Was this ancient manuscript the one used by Aldhelm? It is not likely, since the date proposed by Lowe for Cotton Tib. A.XV, foll. 175–

[15] Mon. Germ. Hist.: Auct. antiquissimi XIV, pp. 81, 17–82, 1.

180, would seem to preclude the identification. The date when Aldhelm composed De metris is uncertain but it was certainly before he became bishop of Sherborne in 705; and four years later he died. But if Aldhelm's codex was a copy of that to which the Cottonian folios once belonged, then there were two manuscripts of Junilius in England by the early eighth century. We may guess that the exemplar came from the continent, probably at the time of Theodore of Tarsus' and Hadrian's mission. Did it also erroneously describe Primasius as bishop of Rome? Kihn's manuscripts, it may be observed, do not mention Primasius' see at all. The error may have been perpetuated in England and have appeared also in the Glastonbury copy of the Instituta, which the chronicler described as ancient. There is no proof, moreover, that Aldhelm read Junilius at Malmesbury. He may have studied this author when he was at Canterbury, and the Glastonbury manuscript may have migrated to Malmesbury before Leland's time. James' theory therefore, though attractive, can by no means be regarded as proved.[16]

Junilius' treatise is an early example in Latin of a "school-book" composed in the form of a dialogue between master and pupil. Kihn, following a majority of the manuscripts that he collated, in his text assigned all the questions to the pupil and all the replies to the teacher. The essential question is, of course, how to interpret the Greek capital letters Δ and M. Did Junilius intend them to retain their meaning in Greek (Διδάσκαλος, Μαθητὴς) or were they meant to represent D and M in Latin (*Discipulus*, *Magister*)? Eleven years after Kihn's book appeared, his procedure was challenged.[17] There are several passages in the Instituta where one or the other of Kihn's manuscripts reverse the order of the two letters, thus giving them their Greek values. Thus in the prefatory letter to Primasius in which Junilius explains his procedure one of the manuscripts (*D*) gives the following reading: "et ne aliqua confusio per antiquariorum, ut adsolet, neglegentiam proveniret, magistro Δ graecam litteram, discipulis M praeposui." The other

[16] M. R. James, Two Ancient English Scholars (Glasgow University Publications XXII [1931]), pp. 12–13. For Glastonbury see John of Glastonbury's Chronicle (Oxford, 1726), p. 442.

[17] A. Rahlfs, "Lehrer und Schüler bei Junilius" in Nachrichten der Göttingenschen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 1891, pp. 242–246.

manuscripts in this place reverse the order of the letters. Two other codices (*N* and *F*), however, through most of the treatise assign the capitals so that they bear their Greek value; [18] so their common exemplar already showed this feature. In another passage the letters are transposed in *M*.[19] But the same phenomenon appears also in a codex that neither Kihn nor Rahlfs had seen, Casinensis 29, as is clear from Dom Inguanez' description.[20] It is possible that the extracts from the Instituta in it were copied from the exemplar of *NF*. But, even if all three codices really represent the text of a single earlier manuscript, the evidence of this and of the early Monacensis is not negligible. In Aldhelm's manuscript, on the other hand, the error, if such it was, had already been committed; for he quotes the passage thus: ". . . ne aliqua confusio . . . neglegentiam proveniret, magistro M graecam litteram, discipulis Δ praeposui." Rahlfs has made out a strong case, and, if he is right, then, as he says, Junilius' manual is not so much a dialogue as a catechism.[21] *Adhuc sub iudice lis est*; but examination of early manuscripts which he did not know, the two Augienses and the codices at Valenciennes and Wolfenbüttel, may prove that Kihn was mistaken in his procedure.

The substantial number of manuscripts containing the Instituta or extracts from them affords the clearest proof for Junilius' popularity in the Middle Ages. Other evidence, though far from negligible, is somewhat disappointing. The book occasionally appears in medieval library catalogues. Its presence in lists from Reichenau, St. Gall, St. Emmeram, and Bobbio does not increase our knowledge since actual manuscripts from these monasteries survive, and it is a case of *praesente urso non est opus quaerere vestigia*! But the manual was at Würzburg not later than 800; St. Riquier, Murbach, Lorsch, and Oviedo possessed copies in the ninth century, and at a later date it is found in catalogues of Naumburg a.d. Saale (saec. xii) and Cluny (saec. xii–xiii).[22] The

[18] See the app. crit. for Kihn, op. cit., p. 471, 6 and 473, 16.

[19] See p. 484, 16. There is also a transposition at p. 484, 13 ff. in AR, but Kihn is probably justified in explaining this as due solely to the omission of the first question in the chapter which happens to be verbally identical with the chapter-heading.

[20] Codd. casin. mss. catalogus, p. 37.

[21] Rahlfs, op. cit. p. 245: "ein 'Katechismus,' dessen Antworten die Schüler auswending zu lernen und dem Lehrer auf seine Fragen herzusagen haben."

[22] Cf. E. A. Lowe in Speculum III (1928), p. 6 with facsimile facing this page;

entry in the Cluny catalogue reads thus: "volumen in quo continetur Iulius Beatus de partibus legis divine ad sanctum Primasium." The form, Iulius, occurs also in the St. Riquier catalogue and must have originated in the error of a scribe copying an unfamiliar (Insular?) script. Beatus as a proper name is a misunderstanding of another sort on which an extant manuscript throws some light. In *D* the title of the book reads as follows: "Incipit liber beati Iunilii ad sc̄m Primasium de partibus legis divinae." As the title in this form is apparently peculiar to *D* amongst those of Kihn's manuscripts which preserve the preface, and as the title of the Cluny codex save for a small variation in word-order is the same, it is legitimate to wonder whether Cluniacensis also contained a text similar to that of *D*.

Traces of the Instituta in extant medieval authors are far less common than might have been expected. Cassiodorus had a copy of the book in his library at Vivarium; for Junilius is one of the writers whom he recommended for study to his monks, and there is also in the Preface to his Institutiones an apparent reminiscence of Junilius' letter to Primasius.[23] The quotation in Aldhelm has already engaged our attention, but I have failed to find any trace of Junilius in Bede. As the book was in England in Bede's day, he may well have seen it and even read it. He would certainly have disapproved of it strongly for more than one reason. His devotion to allegorical interpretation, as practised especially by Gregory I, would have made him frown on a literalist like Junilius. Again, Junilius' curious views on canonical and uncanonical Books in the Bible, views which, as Kihn has demonstrated, reproduce the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia, would have been strongly reprobated by so orthodox a man as Bede. In particular he would have rejected with indignation an author who excluded the Apocalypse from the prophetic Books *primae auctoritatis* and allowed it to be only *mediae auctoritatis*.[24] The presence of a copy of the Instituta in North-eastern France by the later eighth century is

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G. Becker, Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui 11, 98; 37, 368; 26, 8; Strassburger Festschrift zur 46. Philologenversammlung, p. 269; L. Delisle, Le cabinet des manuscrits II, p. 472, no. 359.

[23] Inst. I, 10 (ed. Mynors, p. 34, 11); for the reminiscence of Junilius cf. Mynors, p. 3, 8–10 and also the words "magistri publici" in line 5.

[24] Kihn, op. cit., p. 475, 9 ff.; 480, 1 ff.

proved by the extracts in Reginensis 76 which was compiled in that area. Further proof is afforded by the inclusion of five definitions from Junilius' book in the Liber Glossarum.[25] This huge dictionary was compiled, according to Lindsay's most probable conjecture, at Corbie during the abbacy of Adalhard. Towards the end of the same century a certain Wigbod compiled a work entitled Quaestiones in Octateuchum. He was in all likelihood identical with the abbot Wigbod whom Charlemagne employed on diplomatic missions.[26] His commentary is a collectaneum of passages from the Fathers on the book of Genesis; for the subsequent books it is little more than a transcription of Isidore. It was for this reason that Martène and Durand included only the early part of the exposition of Genesis in their Veterum Scriptorum Collectio; but they were evidently unaware that the Quaestiones as a whole had already been printed by Hervagius in his edition of Bede's works, which appeared in 1563.[27] Wigbod garnered the bulk of his excerpts from Jerome, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Isidore. From time to time he arranged his material in the form of a dialogue between master and pupil, and it is in two of these passages that quotations from Junilius are introduced. The first occurs close to the beginning of the work; it is a verbal transcription, with a few slight omissions, of Instituta II, 1 and 2. The second excerpt is inserted in the later part of the Genesis com-

[25] Glossaria latina (edd. W. M. Lindsay et al.) I, PR 349 (Praedictio), PR 2008 (Profetia), PR 3147 (Proverbialis species), TI 154 (Typus), and VO 94 (Voluntas).

[26] Cf. Wilhelm Levison, England and the Continent in the eighth century (Oxford, 1946), pp. 107, 128–129.

[27] Martène and Durand, op. cit. IX, coll. 293–366, reprinted in Migne, P. L. XCVI, coll. 1101–1168; Hervagius, Ven. Bedae Opera (Cologne ed. of 1688), VIII, coll. 78 sqq. (= P. L. XCIII, coll. 235 sqq.). The manuscript used by Martène and Durand was not the same as that used by Hervagius. Neither of these printed texts is satisfactory, although that printed as Wigbod's is better than the other. His manuscript of Junilius seems to have contained some readings peculiar to the *Ambrosianus* but in the main was inferior to it. Is the work which Coxe in his catalogue of manuscripts in the Bodleian Library described as "Beda super Octateuchum" really Wigbod's? In that case the confusion of authors occurred relatively early. The manuscript in question is Laud. Misc. 159. It was copied at Lorsch during the second half of the ninth century by several scribes writing good Carolingian hands. The provenance, as Dr. E. A. Lowe kindly informs me, is proved by a colophon on fol. 135v. and by the use of an omission-mark characteristic of that scriptorium (Cf. for this, W. M. Lindsay, Palaeographia Latina III, p. 31). The same codex seemingly contains Bede's Hexameron (Cf. N. R. Ker, Medium Aevum for 1944, p. 39).

mentary. Wigbod there copied Junilius' discussion of *typus* (Inst. II, 16) word for word immediately after an extract from Jerome.[28]

In the theological writers of the ninth century and after there are very few discernible traces of Junilius. A rather free quotation from Instituta I, 16, which answers the question, *quot modis significatur Filius*, occurs in the correspondence between Paulus Albarus and John of Seville.[29] Several centuries later one finds a seeming reminiscence of Junilius in John of Salisbury. His statement, "cum et prophetiam non modo de futuris constet esse, sed de praesentibus et futuris et praeteritis," recalls Junilius' definition on the same subject.[30] Yet, though the extant authors rarely quote Junilius, many of them in their youth had doubtless read his manual. This introduction to the study of the Bible, as we have seen, was known in the Middle Ages all over the European Continent as well as in England. Composed in clear and idiomatic Latin, it afforded real, if unobtrusive guidance to the monk or clerk when he was first launched on the troubled sea of Biblical exegesis.

[28] P. L. XCVI, coll. 1106C–1109B; XCIII, 235C–238C): "Haec scriptura quae de praesenti saeculo loquens significet" to "creatori utique scientia ac potentia par fuisset." The second citation is not in the portion of the commentary published by Martène and Durand. It begins (P. L. XCIII, 329C–330B), "Iunilius. Quid est typus," and ends, "in quantum res esse noscuntur."

[29] Carleton M. Sage, Paul Albar of Cordoba (Catholic University of America, 1943), p. 73.

[30] Policraticus I, 12 (ed. C. C. Webb, I, p. 51, 15–17); cf. Kihn, op. cit., p. 473, 14–16: "rerum latentium praeteritarum aut praesentium aut futurarum ex divina inspiratione manifestatio."

ON SOME SURVIVALS OF PAGAN BELIEF IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND

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THANKS to the considerable surviving corpus of Old-Norse literature much is known about Old North-Germanic religious practices and beliefs; by comparison, our knowledge of corresponding matters in the West-Germanic area is meager.[1] For England, historically and sociologically an offshoot of, and by the time of the earliest written records long separated from, the north-west German homeland, our best source of information is a rather miscellaneous collection of charms.[2] Next probably come the epic poem Béowulf [3] and the historian Bede, who especially in his Historia ecclesiastica passim furnishes some additional information.[4] Otherwise one is dependent upon scattered materials, ranging from single words [5] to such cult objects as the cenotaph ship excavated in 1939 at Sutton Hoo in Norfolk.[6] In the face of this relative paucity of knowledge any little additional information may be welcome.

A priori one would assume that the West-Germanic peoples in pagan times had, like their North-Germanic brethren, a devel-

[1] E.g., cp. from a purely quantitative point of view the section on magic in Jan de Vries, Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte, I ("Religion der Südgermanen," Berlin, 1935), 315–317, with Vol. II ("Religion der Nordgermanen," Berlin, 1937), pp. 32–74; see also idem, I, 244–250 ("Die Angelsachsen").

[2] Felix Grendon, ed., "Anglo-Saxon Charms," Journ. of Amer. Folklore, XXII (1909), 105–237, anastatically reprinted by G. Stechert, New York, 1930; an English translation faces Grendon's OE text.

[3] Fr. Klaeber, ed., Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburg (3d ed. with Supplement, Boston: Heath, 1941), pp. xlviii–xlix, clxxvi (esp. "L. IX, 8").

[4] Cp. de Vries, op. cit., I, 171, 201–202.

[5] Discussed by Richard Jente, Die mythologischen Ausdrücke im altenglischen Wortschatz ("Anglistische Forschungen," Vol. 56), Heidelberg, 1921; for cult reflexes in place- and nature-names see further E. A. Philippson, Germanische Heidentum bei den Angelsachsen ("Kölner Anglistische Arbeiten," Vol. 4), Leipzig, 1929, also Bruce Dickins, "English Names and Old-English Heathenism," Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association, XIX (1934), 148–160, and Eilert Ekwall, "Some Notes on English Place-Names Containing Names of Heathen Deities," Englische Studien, LXIX (1936), 55–59.

[6] Antiquity, XIV (1940), 1–87.

oped sense and conception of mana,[7] a force utterly distinct from mere physical power or strength, the possession of which assures success, good fortune, and the like to its possessor. Such a concept, under whatever name, is wide-spread among primitive peoples. The belief in mana among the old North-Germanic (Scandinavian) peoples is thoroughly established and has been set forth briefly but comprehensively by Jan de Vries, op. cit., II, 32–43, with literature.[8] As de Vries points out, the ON concept of mana is verbalized chiefly by the words *máttr*, m., and *megin*, n., both meaning in ordinary contexts "strength"; not far removed from these is *hamingja*, f. "good luck" and in a personal sense "guardian spirit," where it is close to *fylgja*,[8a] f., both transferable from one man to another during life and especially at the moment of death. Persons endowed with a decided or excessive self-confidence are said "to trust in their mana" (*at trúa á mátt sinn ok megin*).[9] The full potency of the gods is *ásmegin*, and *megin-rúnar* are those runes endowed with great magic power. Everything can, and is likely to, have its mana: plants, parts of the human body, the earth itself (*jarðar megin*). The adjective denoting the possession of mana is *máttigr*, *máttugr* "potent" "powerful" and is, for example, applied to the World-Serpent in

[7] For definition and quotations see New English Dictionary; Supplement (Oxford, 1933), s.v., and for general statements on mana see R. R. Marett's articles in Jas. Hastings, ed., Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, VIII (N. Y., 1916), 375–380, and in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed., 1929), XIV, 770–771; R. Pettrazzoni, Enciclopedia italiana, XXII (1934), 75–76; Enciclopedia universal ilustrada Europeo-Americana, XXXII (Madrid, 192–), 659–663, where literature is cited.

Even if not verbalized, I am not at all sure that the concept of personal mana does not survive in the present-day civilized world. One thinks of the self-assured, successful person, convinced of his almost predestined good luck. He is surely a modern *gæfumaðr* with a *hamingja* or *fylgja*; in terms of Old English is he *éadig* or *spédig* in this occult or semi-occult sense. On OE *éadig* "blessed with good luck, mana," see pp. 40–41, below.

[8] I would here call attention to the discussion of the workings or effects of mana (rather than of mana itself) by the distinguished Danish historian of religions Vilhelm Grønbech in The Culture of the Teutons (transl. by Wm. Worster, London–Copenhagen, 1931), I, 127–174 (ch. IV on "Luck," ch. V on "Luck is the Life of the Clan"), III, 14–17 (excursus on "Anglo-Saxon *Spéd*, Luck"). The later German version of this work (Kultur und Religion der Germanen, 2d ed., Hamburg, 1939) does not differ substantially from the English text. Finally I would call attention to the excellent brief statement in Haakon Shetelig-Hjalmar Falk, E. V. Gordon, transl., Scandinavian Archaeology (Oxford, 1937) pp. 411–412.

[8a] See Mogk, art. "Fyljen," Joh. Hoops, ed., Reallexikon d. germanischen Altertumskunde, II, 108–109.

[9] For an OE verbal parallel see p. 39, below.

Völuspá 60, 2 (*moldþinur mátkan* "potent Earth-embracer").

Compared to the Old Norse material Old-English literature can offer only a small showing, but such as there is seems to make clear that the Anglo-Saxons both possessed the concept and verbalized it in various ways.

I. Mana in the Old-English Charms [10]

Mana, personal and other, seems clearly to be referred to in several passages in the Charms and, as in Old Norse, by various words, namely, *cræft*, m., *mægen*, n., *miht*, n., all having in ordinary contexts the general sense of "strength," "power," "might." The first instance is in A 16, a charm against theft of cattle, and occurs in the course of a malediction (ll. 13–15) directed against a cattle-thief:

> Gyf hyt hwá gedó, ne gedíge hit him næfre!
> Binnan þrym nihtum cunne ic his *mihta*,
> his *mægen* and his *mundcræftas*.

("If anyone does this [i.e., steal my cattle], may it never prosper him! [Grant that] I may know his powers, his strength, and his powers of defence within three days"). The *miht*, *mægen*, and *cræft* in question is certainly not physical but is the mana of the thief, whose *mundcræftas* are presumably those aspects of his mana that aid him in avoiding detection. In A 13, a charm to assure the fertility of land, the property owner prays God (ll. 65–67) that no ill-wisher or the like possess sufficient mana to divert or pervert the efficacy of the petitioner's immediately preceding prayer:

> Nú ic bidde ðone Waldend, sé ðe ðás woruld gescéop,
> þæt ne sý nán tó þæs cwidol wíf nó tó þæs *cræftig* man
> þæt áwendan ne mæge word þus gecwedene

("Now I pray the Almighty Who created this world that there be no woman so eloquent nor man so powerful as to be able to pervert words spoken thus.") Here, too, the power implied in the adjective *cræftig* is mana, not mere physical strength. In these

[10] Cited by letter, number and line according to Grendon's edition, cited above.

two passages we have to do with personal mana resident in human beings, but other things have their mana.

Answering closely to ON *ásmegin* "mana of the Æsir, or of divinities in general" is the mana (*mægen*) of certain potent (*mihtig*) women told about in A 1, ll. 7–9; the women are malefic supernatural beings, perhaps to be viewed as dark elves or the like. The charm-doctor is addressing the victim of "sudden stitch" (*fǽrstice*), conceivably standing for lumbago:

> Stód under linde, under leohtum scylde,
> þǽr ðá *mihtige* wíf hyra *mægen* berǽddon

("[I] was standing behind a linden-wood shield, a light shield, as those potent women deliberated on [the use of?] their power.") This *mægen* would be the sum total of the higher, superhuman potency of these minor divinities,[11] *mihtig* the adjective describing the same (cp. *cræftig*, above).

ON *jarðar megin* or "earth-mana" finds a close counterpart in B 5, a charm against an unidentified malady called *wæterelfádl*, literally "water-elf disease" (from the context clearly not dropsy). A semi-metrical charm is to be recited thrice, then comes a closing injunction (ll. 14–15) to be recited often: *Eorþe þé onbere callum hire mihtum and mægenum* ("May earth diminish thee [carry thee off?] with all its powers and potencies"). The "thee" (*þé*) is the disease-bearing water-elf which the earth-mana may help overcome and remove.[12]

In the famous Nine Herbs Charm (B 4) two plants have mana; their mana is not expressed by the nouns *miht* or *mægen* but by the cognate verb *magan* "to be able" "to have potency." The first mentioned, unidentified herb *una*, *yldost wyrta* (l. 3) "the oldest of herbs," is said to be potent against poisons and diseases (ll. 6–8):

> þú *miht* wið .iii. 7 wið .xxx.,
> þú *miht* wið attre 7 wið onflyge,
> þú *miht* wið þá⟨m⟩ láþan ðe geond land færð

[11] In the Christian poem Andreas, l. 142, it is said of the "Mermedonians" that they believed in the power of evil spirits (*hie unlædra eaveðum gelýfdon*); the OE poet may here well have had something on the order of *ásmegin* in mind.

[12] Despite its formal similarity to ON *jarðar megin*, the *eorþmægen* of The Riming Poem, l. 69, seems merely to mean "worldly, earthly strength": *eorðmægen ealdaþ* "worldly strength grows old," i.e., diminishes with age.

("Thou art potent against thirty-three [evils?], thou art potent against poison and against pestilence, thou art potent against that loathly thing [or one?] that sweeps the country.") Also the unidentified herb *stiðe* (perhaps "the strong, potent one") [13] is similarly said to be potent against poison, etc.: *þéos* (*wyrt*) *mæg wið attre*, etc. (ll. 19–20) "this herb is potent against poison," etc. All nine herbs are collectively potent (ll. 45–46) against nine devils, nine poisons, and nine plagues: *Nú magon þás .viiii. wyrta wið nygon wuldorgeflogenum*, etc. ("Now these nine herbs are potent against nine fugitives from Glory [i.e., fallen angels]," etc.)[14]

I conclude this discussion of mana in the Charms with a reference to the agate (D 5, ll. 1–2), a stone whose mana is potent in eight ways: *Be þám stáne, þe* gagātēs *hátte, is sæd þæt hé .viii. mægen hæbbe* ("Of that stone which is called agate [Lat. *gagātēs*] it is said that it has eight potencies"). Without special reference to its *mægen* or *miht* or *cræft*, shavings of the agate (i.e., pulverized agate?) taken in wine is recommended in E 14, l. 2, a charm against elves and strange bewitchment(?) (*uncúþum sidsan*).[15]

II. Heavenly Grace in Béowulf = Christianized Personal Mana

In Béowulf [16] the hero's extraordinary physical strength is made much of and is one of his outstanding characteristics; it is, in

[13] See further the most recent editor of this charm, E. V. K. Dobbie, The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942), pp. cxxxiii–iv, 209, notes ad loc. In connection with the word or name *una*, it is hard not to think of the Lat. fem. adj. *una* "one" "number one," even "the one par excellence." My friend Dr. Sven Liljeblad asks whether the obscure words *una* and *stiðe*, evidently of some quite special potency, may not be tabu names.

[14] Lest it be thought that these forms of the verb *magan* merely mean "be good for" "have therapeutic value" in a straight medical sense, I would note that the ordinary OE verb used to express such an idea is *dugan*, e.g., *þæt déah wið tópwærc* "that is good for toothache."

[15] On the curious and dubious word *sidsa*, see Dag Strömbäck, Sejd: Textstudier i nordisk religionshistoria ("Nordiska Texter och Undersökningar," Vol. 5, Sthlm., 1935), p. 121, note.

Doubtful is the phrase *dýre cræft* of the Exeter Book Riddle No. 82(83), l. 13. Is the mana of metal intended or does this merely refer to the corrupting power of gold? Cp. pp. 41–42, below.

[16] For readers for whom OE is not a comfortable medium yet who may well wish to consider the passages cited in fuller context the following faithful prose translations of the poem are recommended: by Baugh in G. W. McClelland and

fact, mentioned in the course of the poet's first comment upon him (ll. 196–197):

sé wæs moncynnes mægenes strengest
on þǽm dæge þysses lífes

("he was the strongest man in the world at that time").[17] This feature is patently taken over from a similar migratory motif well represented in folktales[18] and attached to the heroic legendary figure of Béowulf the Géat. The hero's superhuman strength is frequently illustrated or demonstrated by reference to specific achievements, for example, his seven days' swim (l. 517), five days of which were spent in the company of Breca (l. 545), his swimming somewhere in the Rhine delta with a load of thirty suits of armor (ll. 2360–62), his superiority in wrestling with the troll Grendel, and his defeat of the latter's mother, in good measure accomplished by the hero's ability to handle a sword heavier than anyone else could have wielded (ll. 1557–61). Béowulf's strength is referred to as *cræft*, *mægen*, *miht*, and *strengu*, all meaning "strength." In l. 380 this is *mægencræft*, of which he is said to have as much as thirty ordinary men in the grip of his hand.[19]

So much for Béowulf's physical strength. Whether the hero is thought of as possessing personal mana in addition to mere physical strength and, if so, whether this is verbalized in the poem, is another question. On general principles one would expect that in ancient tradition he would have possessed mana and that this might have been referred to by such words as *mægen*, *miht*, etc., as in the Charms discussed above. One might also suspect a priori that the Christian author of the OE epic might either not quite have understood the matter or consciously or unconsciously have disguised it. A recent reading of the poem with such questions

A. C. Baugh, Century Types of English Literature Chronologically Arranged (New York, 1925), pp. 4–43, based on Klaeber's first edition (1922) and controlled by the editor; by B. J. Whiting in The College Survey of English Literature, I (New York; Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 20–50, based on Klaeber's third ed. with Supplement (1930).

[17] His strength is similarly referred to in ll. 418, 789, 1219 (*mid cræfte* "vigorously" "in masterful fashion" or the like?), 1844, 2360, 2540, 2678, 2684. On the strength of his grip see note 19, below.

[18] See Klaeber, cit. supra, 3d ed., p. xiii and note.

[19] The strength of his grip is further mentioned or alluded to in ll. 438, 753, 965, 1533–34, 2507. In l. 1335 we read of *hearde clammas*, meaning either "strong grips" or perhaps, rather, "powerful (bear-like) hugs."

in mind has all but convinced me that the latter is the case and that, though very likely not mathematically demonstrable, the probabilities are high that in certain passages mana lurks just behind a thin veil of so-called "Christian coloring." [20] The first passage in question (ll. 669–670) tells of Béowulf's state of mind before his encounter with Grendel:

> Húru Géata léod georne trúwode
> módgan mægenes, Metodes hyldo

("Indeed the prince of the Géats firmly believed in his glorious *mægen*, favor of the Creator.") At the outset one may note the obvious verbal parallel between the OE phrase *trúwian mægenes* and the OIcel. *trúa á mátt sinn ok megin*, noted p. 34, above. Now Béowulf may be thinking only of his physical strength, thanking God, as it were, for the blessing of a rugged constitution, but such an interpretation I view as unlikely. Somehow equated by the poet with something akin at least to free grace,[21] this *mægen* strongly suggests something more than, and rather different from, physical strength. It is, first and foremost, divine and presumably to be regarded as referring to the hero's personal mana explained in partly Christian terms.[22]

The second passage (ll. 1270–73) occurs in the course of a résumé of the Grendel episode:

> hwæðre hé gemunde mægenes strenge,
> gimfæste gife, ðe him God sealde,
> and him tó Anwaldan áre gelýfde,
> frófre and fultum

("nevertheless he remembered the might of *mægen*, generous gift which God had given him, and counted on favor, consolation, and

[20] On this in general see Klaeber, 3d ed., pp. xlviii–li.

[21] For which the words *ést*, m.f., *hyldu*, f. "favor," *ár*, f. "honor" "favor," and probably most often *giefu*, f. "gift," are used in vernacular theological writings of later date. For a list of words for "grace" in OE. Christian poems and the OE Bede, also references to the same, see M. P. Hamilton, "The Religious Principle in "Beowulf," Publ. Mod. Lang. Ass'n of America, LXI (1946), 312–313, n. 21. Miss Hamilton, I may note, is dealing with quite different passages and is concerned with altogether different matter than those under consideration here.

[22] Cp. Grønbech, op. cit., III, 14: "The Old English poets struggle to graft the spiritual lessons of Christianity on the ancient psychology, and this conflict between form and content . . . is profoundly interesting in showing us the force and stubborn vitality of Teutonic culture."

aid from the Almighty"). The phrase *mægenes strengu* "strength of might" itself tells nothing, but the context of divine source points to mana. This passage invites close comparison with another (ll. 2181–83), couched in much the same language and referring to the hero's long and successful rule as king of the Géats:

> ac hé mancynnes mæste cræfte
> ginfæstan gife, þe him God sealde,
> héold hildedéor

("nevertheless he, a man brave in battle, with the greatest ability [self-restraint?] of anybody, kept [guarded?] the generous gift which God had given him"). Such is the received interpretation of the passage, but in the light of the present discussion a suggestion made by Professor Johannes Hoops of Heidelberg becomes decidedly attractive.[23] According to Hoops (op. cit., p. 78) it should be rendered: "And yet he of all humans, the man brave in battle, had the greatest power, the generous gift which God had given him." This interpretation brings *cræft*, construed by Hoops as of feminine gender, into line with *mægen* as apparently used above and below and to an extent, as above, equates mana with Heavenly grace.[24] Finally it may be observed that Divine power is said (ll. 939–941) to account for the hero's victory over Grendel:

> Nú scealc hafað
> þurh Drihtenes miht dǽd gefremede
> ðé wé ealle ær ne meahton

("Now through the might of the Lord a warrior has accomplished a deed which none of us [Danes] were previously able to contrive").

In addition to possible direct allusions to Béowulf's mana expressed in terms of *mægen*, etc., mention may be made of the adjectives *éadig* and *sigoréadig* "blessed with good luck" "vic-

[23] Béowulfstudien ("Anglistische Forschungen," Vol. 74, Heidelberg, 1932), pp. 76–78 (§ 15. "Zum Genus von ae. *cræft*"); see also Klaeber, 3d ed., p. 207, note ad loc.

[24] Hoops (p. 77) sees clearly the parallelism between this passage and that of ll. 1270–73; his difficulty in finding a sensible meaning for *gifu* (l. 2182) in terms of the older interpretation is, however, unnecessary: regardless of *cræft*, however construed, it could refer to Heavenly grace.

torious as a result of possessing good luck," the latter being but a manifestation of one's mana. Such would seem to be the sense of *éadig* in ll. 1224–25: *wes . . . éadig*! ("be blessed with success!") said by Fréawaru to Béowulf,[25] similarly *sigoréadig secg* ("warrior blessed with luck, mana, bringing victory in its train"), applied to the hero in ll. 1310, 2352.

In one other passage in the poem, referring to the rather shadowy pre-Scylding king of the Danes, Heremód (ll. 1716–18), we very likely have a reference to royal mana,[26] veiled as before under the Christian concept of Heavenly grace:

> ðéah þe hine mihtig God mægenes wynnum,
> eafeðum stépte, ofer ealle men
> forð gefremede

("though God Almighty had advanced him in [by?] the joys of *mægen*, by deeds of might put him ahead of everybody"). Earlier we are told (ll. 901–902) that Heremód had once been a strong and valorous man, with no indication, however, of his being a superstrong man:

> siððan Heremódes hild sweðrode,
> eafoð and ellen

("after Heremód's prowess in battle had diminished, his strength and valor"). His *mægenes wynne* (pl.)[27] and *eafoðu*, said to derive from God, would seem to answer to the *hamingja* of the Scandinavian kings of old and thus be of a piece with Béowulf's *mægen*, already discussed.[28] Finally I would mention *éacencræftig*

[25] For *éadig* and other words, notably *spéd*, bearing the general sense of "good luck" see Grønbech, op. cit., I, 126–154, and esp. the excursus in III, 14–19.

[26] See de Vries, op. cit., II, 34, § 38, on the royal *hamingja*, and cp. Grønbech, I, 131–138.

[27] One wonders if Heremód's implied loss of mana was due to the violation of a tabu, mana's negative aspect; some notion of this sort is certainly latent in ll. 2329–31, where Béowulf fears he may have angered the Lord.

It seems improbable that Heremód's *mægen* here refers to power in any sense of "dominion" or "sway," for which the words used are *wealdan* (vb.) "to hold sway" or *geweald* (sb.) "sway" "dominion" as in ll. 30, 442, 465, 1057, 1079–80, 1727 (of God), 1959, 2211 (of the dragon), 2732; also but less commonly, forms of (*ge*)*healdan* "hold sway, power" in ll. 161, 911, 2208, 2373. In 2389–90 *healdan* and *gewealdan* vary one another. The vb. *rixian*, the common OE verb meaning "to rule" is used only in l. 144.

[28] In 1886–87 the poet says that old age (*yldo*) deprived Hróþgár of *mægenes wynne* (pl.), but nothing is said of a divine origin, and I am inclined to regard this

"prepotent" used in l. 3051 to describe the dragon's hoard (*þæt yrfe* "inheritance") and presumably referring to the powerful and baleful mana of the gold treasure (cp. n. 15, above).

In view of the general background of the existence of belief in mana among the Anglo-Saxons as all but demonstrated by the Charms I am, accordingly, inclined to urge the possibility and even probability that this concept likewise exists and is verbalized in Béowulf. By the same token I would urge the point that in a number of the passages discussed this ancient pagan mana has been "colored" by the Christian poet and presented to us more or less in terms of Heavenly grace (*interpretatio Christiana*). Such in general is the blending of Christian and pagan thought throughout the epic.[29]

III. Béowulf's Funeral Obsequies: Addenda Minora

Béowulf's funeral obsequies (ll. 3134–82) out on the unidentified headland "Whale's Ness" (*Hrones Næss*, l. 2805), presumably somewhere on the coast of Östergötland, constitute one of the most striking and most moving scenes in the poem. The pagan character of the hero's cremation burial and the impressive tumulus in which his ashes (*bronda láf*, l. 3160) and other grave furnishings (cp. ll. 3163–67a) were deposited has been amply discussed and illustrated; [30] also the chanting of a funeral elegy (ll. 3171 to end). Beside these salient points are one or two other details quite characteristic of Old-Germanic heathendom which do not seem to have been brought out in the editions.

1. The Headland Burial

In ll. 2802–08 Béowulf gives parting instructions that his tumulus or barrow, referred to variously as *hlǽw* and *beorh*, be constructed out on a headland (*æt brimes nosan*, l. 2803), "Whale's Ness," mentioned above, as a conspicuous landmark for future

as on the order of the *eorþmægen* discussed in n. 12, above, and not a reference to royal mana.

[29] It is not inherently unlikely that all or nearly all instances of superhuman strength, whether in Béowulf or in the folktales, look back ultimately to mana, rationalized in one way or another. But this is another matter and need not detain us here.

[30] Klaeber, 3d ed., pp. xlviii, 229–230.

seafarers who will easily identify it and who henceforth will call it "Béowulf's Barrow" (*Biowulfes biorh*, l. 2807). This last wish is executed in ll. 3156–60, where one is told that this monument (*bécn*, l. 3160) took (only) ten days to build (implying, one may say, a veritable battalion of slave-laborers).[31] This site may conceivably have been chosen by the dying hero on the same basis that a similar choice might be made today, namely, out of personal vanity and a desire for a conspicuous last resting-place with attendant posthumous notoriety,[32] and so the poet may have conceived it. Far more likely, however, is the view set forth by de Vries, op. cit., II, 89, that the hero wished to be buried there in order better to protect his homeland from foes approaching by sea. Thus, though dead, Béowulf would be able to perform a function similar to that of the Danish coast-guard (ll. 229 ff., passim) in whose presence the true action of the poem may be said to begin.

Excursus

Beside the Scandinavian parallels adduced by de Vries (II, 88) one might add the case of Beli, king of the Norwegian Sygnir of old, who in *Friðþjófs s. ins frækna* (ch. 1) gave orders to be buried by the waters of Sognefjord: *Ekki skal fé bera í haug hjá mér; haugr minn skal standa hjá firðinum* ("No wealth shall be put in the barrow with me; my barrow shall be by the fjord").[33] From outside the Germanic world de Vries (II, 88) further notes

[31] I.e., if conceived in size as anything like the great tumuli dating from this very period (late sixth century) at Gamla Uppsala, Sweden. For photographs and scales see Sune Lindquist, Gamla Uppsala — Fornminnen (Sthlm., 1929), esp. p. 11.

[32] So more or less Knut Stjerna, J. R. Clark Hall, transl., Essays on Questions Connected with the Old English Poem of Beowulf (Coventry, 1912), pp. 204–205. In this same connection Stjerna refers to Þjóðólfr of Hvin's Ynglingatal, stz. 24–25 (35–36), in which we are told of the slaying of Ingvarr at the hands of the Esthonian army: *ok austmarr / jófri sænskum / Gymis ljóð / at gammi kveðr* ("and the Baltic sings a song of the sea to delight the Swedish warrior"). As Stjerna observes, such expression is vs. Béowulf highly romantic, but more to the point is the fact that there is really no parallel at all between the burials of Ingvarr and Béowulf. Ingvarr is slain by his foes by chance by the sea; his burial site, if one is to understand the passage thus, is consequently not of his own choosing, and he certainly was not buried where he was by his enemies with any view of his spirit protecting anybody or anything. He was just plain buried. In a word there can be no question in Ynglingatal of a faded or romantic rationalization of the kind of burial we have in Béowulf.

[33] V. Ásmundarson, ed., Fornaldarsögur Norðurlanda, II (Rvík, 1886), 116; near Beli was later entombed Þorsteinn bóndi, father of Friþþjófr (ibid.). It is of passing

the legend of Eurystheus, buried in similarly strategic fashion in Athens,[34] also two British parallels, one concerning Bendigeit Vran, i.e., Bran the Blessed, legendary one-time ruler of all Britain, the other about the British (Kentish) prince Vortimer.[35] The story of Bran, son of Llyr, is briefly told: fatally wounded by a poisoned spear he orders his followers to cut off his head, then says: "And take you the head . . . and bear it to Gwynfryn in London and bury it there with the face toward France." [36] This request is ultimately carried out, though nothing is told of the purpose of the act which is, however, no doubt as de Vries suggests.

The Vortimer episode is not only more elaborate than that of Bran but, especially in Geoffrey of Monmouth's account, offers a far closer parallel to Béowulf's burial. The story in the ninth-century Nennian Historia Britonum, ch. 44, ad fin.,[37] runs thus:

Ille [Guorthemir] autem post modicum interuallum mortuus est et ante mortem suam ad familiam suam dixit, ut sepulchrum illius in portu ponerent a quo exierant, super ripam maris, "in quo uobis commendo: quamuis in alia parte portum Brittanniae teneant [Saxones] et habitauerint, tamen in ista terra in aeternum non manebunt." Illi autem mandatum eius contempserunt et eum in loco in quo imperauerat illis non sepelierunt.

Here it is quite clear that Vortimer counted on the power of his spirit to protect his countrymen from invasion, at least in the area

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interest to note that this feature of the saga has been carried over by Esaias Tegnér in his versified paraphrase, Fritjofs saga, canto III, ad init.

[34] I have not been able to trace this story to its source, but in view of de Vries' confusion of Vortigern with Vortimer (n. 35) one wonders if he perhaps had in mind Oedipus' last resting place at or under Kolonos Hippios, 2 km. from Athens. In Sophocles' Oedipus Coloneus, ll. 1524–25 (cp. ll. 1764–1765), Oedipus promises Theseus that his grave will prove a permanent defense, if the site is kept secret.

[35] Not, as de Vries has it, the latter's father Vortigern, legendary king of Kent at the time of the *adventus Saxonum*.

[36] Translation according to T. P. Ellis and John Lloyd, The Mabinogion: A New Translation, I (Oxford, 1929), 67 ("Branwen uerch Lyr"). For a faithful French translation and notes see Joseph Loth, Les Mabinogion du Livre Rouge de Hergest, I (2d rev. ed., Paris, 1913), 144–145. Both these translations supersede Lady Charlotte Guest's long standard rendering of the Welsh classic. For the Welsh text see Ifor Williams, ed., Pedeir Keinc y Mabinogi (Cardiff, 1930), pp. 44–45. The London locality *Gwynfryn*, lit. "White or Blessed Hill," was identified by Lady Guest as the site of the Tower; Ifor Williams (note ad loc., p. 214) suggests the hill upon which St. Paul's stands (cp. the street-name "Ludgate Hill").

[37] Text according to Edmond Faral, La légende arthurienne, III (Paris, 1929), 33; for an English translation see A. W. Wade-Evans, Nennius's "History of the Britons," etc. (London, 1938), p. 67.

near his tomb. Geoffrey of Monmouth's mid-twelfth-century account is fuller. Whereas the Historia Britonum by silence suggests that Vortimer died of natural causes, in Geoffrey's Historia Regum Britanniae, ch. 102, ad fin.,[38] his step-mother Ronwen gives him a poisoned drink:

Nec mora, iussit omnes milites suos uenire ad se et, indicata morte quae superueniebat, distribuit eis aurum atque argentum suum et quicquid ataui congesserant. Flentes quoque et eiulantes consolabatur, docens uiam uniuersae carnis esse, quam initurus erat. Audaces autem et bellicosos iuuenes, qui ei in debellationibus suis astare solebant, hortabatur, ut pro patria pugnantes eam ab hostili irruptione tueri niterentur.

Audacia autem maxima docente, iussit pyramidem sibi fieri aeriam locarique in portu quo Saxones applicare solebant, corpus uero suum, postquam defunctum foret, sepelire desuper, ut, uiso busto, barbari retortis uelis in Germania redirent. Dicebat enim neminem illorum audere propius accedere, si etiam bustum ipsius aspicerent.

O maximam uiri audaciam, qui eis, quibus uiuus terrori fuerat, post obitum etiam ut timeretur optabat! Sed, defuncto illo, aliud egerunt Britones, quia in urbe Trinouantum [*London*] [39] corpus illius sepelierunt.

Geoffrey knew and used the Historia Britonum but in the present story he goes far beyond this, either having access to oral or literary tradition [40] or was inventing freely, an art of which he was certainly capable. At all events he adds a great many features over the Nennian account: poisoning as the cause of death (cp. Béowulf, l. 2715a), an entourage of disobedient warrior retainers (cp. Wígláf and cowardly retainers in *B.*) vs. the family in Nennius, the preliminary distribution of treasure (cp. the same to Wígláf in *B.* ll. 2809–12 and cp. ll. 2729–30, though not the dragon's hoard, ll. 3011b–21a), and the exhortation to defend the fatherland. In the Historia Britonum there is only talk of an inhumation burial, in Geoffrey a "pyramid" is called for (cp. the

[38] Ed. Faral, op. cit., III, 182; English translation in Giles, op. cit., p. 189. For another current edition of Geoffrey, see Acton Griscom. The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth, etc. (London-N. Y., 1929), pp. 374–375, with a translation of the corresponding Welsh adaptation at foot of pages.

[39] If the Trinovantes ever really had anything approaching a capital city (*urbs*), this would presumably have been Camulódunum (Colchester, Ess.); Geoffrey, however, clearly intends London (see Faral, III, 92, ll. 5–14). In an intermediate fashion popular etymology has here been at work, with *Tri-* for Troia and *-nova-* for Nova!

[40] If the latter, it would seem to be unknown to the commentator Faral, op. cit., II, 226–227.

hlǽw, beorh in *B.*), the sight of which (*busto viso*) [41] will turn back an invasion fleet (in *B.* merely a beacon for seafarers). As in Nennius Vortimer's last injunctions are disregarded, Geoffrey adding that they (the retainers) buried him in the chief city of the Trinovantes. By parenthetical references I have drawn attention to a number of points in which Geoffrey's additions to Nennius more or less answer to certain features in Béowulf; I would also hasten to point out striking differences: (1) before his death Béowulf says nothing about his remains or barrow repelling a hostile force (though this is the clear subaudition); (2) Béowulf's retainers execute his last wishes meticulously. Since Geoffrey was writing only some 125–150 years after the Béowulf Ms. (Brit. Mus., Ms. Cotton Caligula A XV) was written, it is not theoretically impossible that he had read, perhaps more likely heard the account of Béowulf's funeral obsequies and appropriated elements from it.[42] This is certainly no point to be pressed nor is it totally to be ignored.

2. THE PERAMBULATION OF "BÉOWULF'S BARROW"

þá ymbe hlǽw riodan hildedéore (l. 3169).

"Then around the barrow rode men brave in battle." So we are told of the perambulation of Béowulf's barrow. This riding-around is no mere idle activity but a clearly defined ritual act, the symbolic enclosing or hedging in of the tumulus and adjacent area for the benefit and protection of the deceased.[43]

[41] Here *bustum* certainly means "tomb" or the like and refers specifically to the pyramid, not in its original and etymological sense of "crematory." The Welsh adaptor of Geoffrey has with his phrase "ordered them to burn his body" (ed. Griscom, p. 375) obviously misunderstood *viso busto*, taking *busto* as a verb form, the ppl. of (*com*)*buro*.

[42] In rather reduced form Geoffrey's tale of Vortimer continues in his Epigoni, the Norman Wace and the Englishman Lawman. See Ivor Arnold, ed., Le Roman de Brut de Wace (Soc. des anciens textes franç.), I (Paris, 1938), 380–381, ll. 7174–86 (Vortimer is said to be buried in London); Sir Fred. Madden, ed., Laȝamon's Brut, II (London, 1847), 205–206, ll. 15028–73 (Vortimer is said to be buried in London, more specifically by Billingsgate: *A*-text, *Bælzes ȝate*; *B*-text, *Bellinges ȝate*).

[43] On this see de Vries, op. cit., I, 313, also p. 271 (at top) for other Anglo-Saxon perambulations expressed by the verb *begán* and the sb. *begang*. On the literal enclosing of sacred places see idem, I, 267 and II, 107–108 (illustrative inter alia of *æt hærgtrafum* of l. 175).

THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN SELF-TRANSCENDENCE IN THE DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY

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Man poses for himself his most tantalizing problems. He seeks to discover what he is, to foresee whither he goes, and to find what limits are imposed on his progress. He ponders his connections with the realm of matter, and seeks to locate himself within a larger sphere of an all-inclusive Reality. As a citizen of the world of space and time, man feels an essential homelessness, and reaches out toward a possible realm in which those aspirations which are unfulfilled in his present experience may find fulfilment. He persists in looking beyond himself as an individual, and beyond the social group of which he is a part. In so doing he is confronted with a tension between the world of possibility which he intuits and his own present situation.

While this phase of the interpretation of human nature has been a subject of general concern to scholarship, the problem under consideration has been posed in new form by the contemporary movement known as the Dialectical Theology. The thinkers of this school have sought to harmonize a pessimistic interpretation of man with the insights of modern science into human nature and human behavior. In support of their position, they adduce the present world situation, and seek to utilize as well the pessimistic anthropology which they feel to be characteristic of the Christian Scriptures. The development of the specific question of human self-transcendence occurs chiefly in the writings of the following: Karl Barth, H. Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

It is Emil Brunner who furnishes the following definition of human self-transcendence:

> Whether he will or not, in some way or other he must reach out beyond himself; he must transcend himself; he must measure his thinking, willing, and acting by something higher than himself.[1]

[1] Brunner, H. Emil, Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), p. 20.

It is due to the internal character of the Dialectical Theology that the problem of human nature, the understanding of its limits, and the determination of the nature of its *rapport* with the over-world, stand as questions of major religious and philosophical significance. The crisis theologians take as their point of departure the permanent and abiding contradictions with which man is confronted as he lives in the two-fold position of child of nature, and as 'a spirit who stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason, and the world.' [2]

In this discussion the term 'Barthian' as applied to an individual will be avoided. It is taken for granted that the reader is familiar with the general character of the Dialectical Theology as it elaborates the thesis expressed by Søren Kierkegaard that there exists an 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and that this implies a radical disjunction between God in heaven and man on earth.[3] Thus the inclusion of a given thinker within the ranks of the crisis theologians will be made upon the basis of his attitude toward the series of disjunctions which Karl Barth sees as pivotal to any valid biblical theology or to any true philosophy.

I

The influence of Søren Kierkegaard upon the Dialectical Theology is most noticeable at the point of his emphasis upon the religious significance of the lone individual. He viewed the Church of Denmark as the example *par excellence* of the institution into which men went for shelter, and within which they felt safe to do collectively that which no one of them would dare to do as an individual. The primary religious problem appeared to him to be that of isolating the individual, and of confronting him with himself as personally culpable, and with the 'Absolute Paradox' of the entry of eternity into time in the Incarnation.[4] This conviction has found an echo in the writings of Karl Barth, who finds the

[2] Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York, 1941), Vol. I, p. 3.

[3] Barth, Karl, The Epistle to the Romans, Tr. from the 6th German edition by Dewyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford, 1933), p. 10.

[4] Gemmer, Anders and August Messer, Søren Kierkegaard und Karl Barth (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 84f.

crux of religion to inhere in the uniqueness of the individual as he must appear before the judgement-seat: this *futurum aeternum* seems to him to be the critical truth of our being and existence.

The writings of Barth at this point are largely homiletical, and his discussion of the subject lacks the philosophical exactness which is shown in the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, who sees the maintenance of the notion of genuine individuality to be the *sine quâ non* of any true system of philosophy. Instead of the Christian sense of individuality, this author sees since the Renaissance the development of that which he calls the 'modern sense of individuality' [5] in which development both the Renaissance and the Reformation have attempted to liberate man from the chains which medieval Catholicism placed upon the individual. He sees the Middle Ages as bound to a scheme of previous 'tribal unity,' the pattern for which was set by the Teutonic tribes. Protestantism has sought to point the way to a transcending of the *mores* and institutions of tribal life upon a basis which has 'an ultimate religious warrant.' [6] The Renaissance, on the other hand, sought to develop the motif of individuality to a point outside the limits set in the Christian religion. Reacting against Roman authoritarianism, the Renaissance developed an entirely new type of individualism, for which no proper counterpart existed in ancient classicism.

From this historical development emerged the 'autonomous individual' in whom true individualism is lost. One of the most powerful factors in this modern debacle has been bourgeois capitalism; within capitalism there appears the paradoxical situation in which human self-reliance promises to achieve for each individual a large measure of autonomy, while at the same time the emergence of industrialized and mechanized society subordinates the individual to the process.[7] A parallel loss of proper individualism has occurred in Naturalism, in which man's spiritual dimensions are reduced to either: (a) an undifferentiated stream of consciousness, or (b) a particular type of manifestation of matter in mechanical process.

[5] Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 22f; 76ff.
[6] Op. cit., pp. 57–59.
[7] Ibid., pp. 65f.

> . . . naturalistic psychology rises with difficulty to the concept of organic unity in consciousness and only occasionally makes the self and self-consciousness an object of particular study. The real profundities of self-consciousness, the complex problems of personality, in the breadth of its relations to the world of nature and history on the one hand and in the depth of its dimensions as self-conscious ego on the other, are the concerns of only those schools of psychology which frankly leave the confines of natural science, and regard psychology as a cultural science, which means that their psychological investigations are guided by philosophical and therefore semi-religious presuppositions.[8]

Parallel to the loss of the proper view of the individual in Naturalism, is the more sophisticated submergence of the self in Idealism, not necessarily by virtue of the emphasis upon the 'universal Mind' (since such thinkers as Leibnitz and Herbart defend an idealistic pluralism) but by the persistent effort of Idealism to transform the moral paradox of the New Testament, "whosoever loseth his life will find it," into an ontological paradox. It is the contention of Professor Niebuhr that Idealism, whatever form it may assume, reduces the concept of the self to the attenuated concept of mere numerical particularity, in which is absent 'the distinctive depth of spirit which distinguishes human individuality from the particularity of nature.' [9]

The same author finds the individual to fare no better in Romanticism, which likewise lacks the dimension of depth necessary to the comprehension of the self-transcending human spirit. Logically this movement should be the exponent *par excellence* of the doctrine of the self; in reality it emphasizes the rôle of the organism as a part of nature, to the disparagement of the 'spirit.' Thus the 'individual' which Romanticism attempts to preserve becomes either (a) subordinated to the collective group through his relation to the realm of nature, conceived as historically determined; or (b) himself a god, with no law save his own will-to-power, as occurs in the highly individualistic system of Nietzsche.

Of the things which Dr. Niebuhr says concerning the individual and his fate in modern thought, the following is the sum: in what-

[8] Ibid., p. 74.
[9] Ibid., pp. 76–78.

ever directions thought has moved since the Renaissance (save for some relatively minor currents of Reformed thought which have held themselves outside the spirit of modernity) the tendency has been to submerge the *self* into some larger totality. It is at this point that the Dialectical Theology sees the Christian religion as unique; it interprets Christianity as making its appeal to the individual in his solitariness, and as facing him with the *krisis* which in reality confronts man at every turn, and which reaches its most acute form in the crisis of the individual before God.

The relation of this consideration to the question of human self-transcendence will appear more clearly in the course of this study. For the present, it can be said that the Crisis Theology sees self-transcendence as possible only at the level of the individual. It distinguishes radically between the upward thrust of life at the sub-human level, and the upreach of man toward the over-world. Man's transcendence of himself, in both its true and its false sense, is held to occur only by virtue of the limits which God has placed about man, and which in the last analysis are individual limits.

II

The problem of human self-transcendence is primarily a problem of boundary. Until some conclusion can be reached concerning the proper frontier of human nature, nothing clear can be said concerning the transcending of that frontier. Prior to this, it is necessary to decide whether man's nature has a boundary, or whether it merely possesses an end, since the idea of 'frontier' contains within itself the implication of something beyond.[10] This latter consideration assumes especial importance in the investigation of the Dialectical Theology, with its insistence upon the absolute transcendence of God. Its criticisms of current interpretations of human nature are made primarily in terms of the *Grenzproblem*. The focal point of this system, namely the Kierkegaardian recognition of "the infinite qualitative distinction" between eternity and time, and between God and man, sets the pattern for the consideration of the question of the proper frontiers of the individual. At this point, the basic position of the crisis

[10] Ulrich, Hans, Das Transzendenzproblem bei Karl Barth (Tübingen, 1936), pp. 11f.

theologians is that the relation between time and eternity, and between man and God, cannot in any sense be described in terms of either continuity or contiguity.

The attitude assumed in this matter by modern philosophy seems to Barth to be the point at which it most violently contradicts the Christian understanding of eternity and time. Some types of thought see the eternity-time relation in a manner which may be illustrated by a line of infinite duration (eternity), with a segment (time) set somewhere within it and bounded by the limitations of time-space. In this view, eternity and time are essentially continuous; time is but eternity qualified in a certain way. Another view may be illustrated by two circles: a large one (presumably of infinite size), and a small one, its circumference touching the larger one. Here is illustrated the view of contiguity. The third possible geometrical illustration of the problem in hand is that of the small circle (time) within the circle of infinite size (eternity). Although either of these latter two illustrations provide no obvious answer to the question of possible transition from the small circle to the large one, both fail to do justice to the real character of the relation existing between time and eternity.

Eternity, says Barth, is absolutely and qualitatively *other*. It stands under a wholly different species; none of the categories of spatio-temporal thinking are applicable to it. Not even the illustration of an infinite circle, representing eternity, standing above a horizontal line, representing time, would satisfy the dialectical theologian, although this type of diagram, with a line drawn down from within the circle to the horizontal line, intersecting it perpendicularly from above, is the nearest approach to an illustration allowed by Karl Barth.[11]

This same absolute disjunction is held to exist with respect to another set of parallel factors, namely God and man. God is not merely Other, but Wholly Other. Neither in the nature of man, nor in the constitution of his world, can there be found any indication concerning the nature of God. Under the conditions of this denial of natural theology, God ought logically to be defined by a series of negations. This feature is offset by the doctrine of Reve-

[11] **Barth,** Karl, Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes: Prolegomena zur Kirklichen Dogmatik (Munich, 1932), pp. 326ff. (Hereafter referred to as Kirkliche Dogmatik.)

lation, in terms of which Barth seeks upon another level to establish the possibility of a positive knowledge of God. Friedrich Gogarten threatens to push the negative motif to its ultimate conclusion, as he defines God as the Unrecognized, the Uncomprehended, and the Immeasurable.[12] One is inclined to feel that these thinkers are employing hyperboles for the purpose of emphasizing one idea which they feel to have become lost in modern thinking, namely the doctrine of the transcendence of God.

It is at this point that the crisis theologians have found themselves at pains to retain their system of the absolute disjunction. So long as theology and ethics are kept in interrelation, there must be a dialectic within any system based upon a radical discontinuity between God and man. Thus, the discussion of human self-transcendence cannot proceed until some prior questions concerning the existence of an ethical sense in man, and of institutions in society presupposing such an ethical sense, are answered.

Karl Barth finds himself in particular difficulty at this point. He is violently opposed to any form of ethical intuitionism, whereby man receives any hint (small though it be) of the existence of God from the moral constitution of the world. This renders him at pains to 'explain' the portions of Romans which deal with 'the law written in their hearts,' especially verses 14–29 of Chapter II. In his commentary upon this passage, he leaves the impression of seeking to meet the objection with a *tour de force*: his argument is conducted by means of vivid figures of speech, which might easily divert the mind of the reader from the real point at issue.

> The law is the impression of divine revelation left behind in time, in history, and in the lives of men; it is a heap of clinkers marking a fiery miracle which has taken place, a burnt-out crater disclosing the place where God has spoken, a solemn reminder of the humiliation through which some men had been compelled to pass, a dry canal which in a past generation and under different conditions had been filled with the living water of faith and of clear perception, a canal formed out of ideas and conceptions and commandments, all of which call to mind the behavior of certain other men, and demand that their conduct should be maintained. The men who have the law

[12] Gogarten, Friedrich, Von Glauben und Offenbarung (Jena, 1923), p. 11.

> are the men who inhabit this empty canal. They are stamped with the impress of the true and unknown God, because they possess the form of traditional and inherited religion, or even the form of an experience which had once been theirs.[13]

Stripped of excess verbiage, this statement seems to mean that man, though now fallen, still bears the marks of a former knowledge of God.

In his anxiety to maintain the otherness of God, Barth appears to commit the error of denying that good can be really good until God pronounces it so. This is a virtual admission of failure to account for the evidences of morality in the institutions of society, and for the existence of sanctions to uphold that morality. It is at this point that Barth parts company with Emil Brunner, who has at this point made his largest single contribution to clear thought upon the subject. The ethical thought of Professor Brunner is conditioned by his eschatological viewpoint, which places him that far in the tradition of Barth. For both of these thinkers there is between the beginning and the ending of the universal order an interval, in which the plans of God are more or less adequately realized in human life and human society. It is interesting to note in this connection that the periodical which expresses the thought of the dialectical school is entitled Zwischen den Zeiten.

The ethical thought of Brunner is frankly geared to the motif of the interval; his system presupposes the temporary and finite character of man, and hence defends its relativism upon the ground of the necessity for the constant expansion and adaptation in the conditions of finite life. While Barth is inclined to ignore the rather evident appearance of a divine ordering in the world of finite being, Brunner is favorable to that type of interpretation of Natural Law which divides the field of human endeavor between the areas regulated by the Orders (*die Ordnungen*), and those regulated by the Imperative (*das Gebot*).

The Orders are *given* to the individual; they represent the will of God in a secondary and imperfect form. They are five in number: the family, the economic system, the state, the cultural pat-

[13] Barth, Epistle to the Romans, p. 65.

tern, and the church.[14] They afford the background against which may be developed and elaborated the Christian ethic. Membership in the orders implies individual responsibility, and may at times involve the individual in ethical paradoxes. Brunner does not attempt to arbitrate the difficulties which emerge in the conflicting relationships between man and man, and between man and his society. These are considered to be inevitable to man under conditions of his finite life.

The complement to Brunner's doctrine of the Orders is his view of the Imperative. He is sharply critical of both naturalistic and rationalistic systems of ethics, denying that a proper ethic (i.e. a Christian ethic) can be deduced from a study either of the physical structure of man, or of his rational faculties. He ventures therefore to inquire whether it may not be well to seek such an ethic from another source — from God as a moral revealer. Such an ethic will be something delivered by God and received by man. As partaking of the nature of a God who is completely transcendent, it may be expected to come into conflict at some points with man's natural desires. Being of such a nature, it is acceptable to faith alone, and should not be expected to comport wholly with the demands of either science or philosophy, since these latter are incapable of taking into account the paradoxes which inhere in man's inner nature.[15]

From the foregoing may be deduced the chief logical consequences of Brunner's theory to the question of man's boundary. That such an ethical thinker should have appeared in the movement begun by Karl Barth tells much concerning the inner nature of the problem. The conclusion is inescapable that the Barthian view of the absolute otherness of God from man is open to the most grave difficulties when viewed from the standpoint of a realistic ethical theory. Hence the walls of the disjunctive structure are weak at the point which is most significant for the problem in hand. In other words, the complete otherness of God from man is difficult to maintain in the light of the study of ethics. No view of the problem of man's frontiers can at the same time take ethics seriously, and deny that some type of continuity exists between

[14] Brunner, H. Emil, The Divine Imperative (New York, 1937), pp. 6ff; 333f.
[15] Ibid., pp. 23f; pp. 34–37.

God and man by which a natural theology is possible. This consideration prepares the way for a further modification of the problem of the boundary which takes place at the hand of Reinhold Niebuhr, and which will be considered in the concluding section of this article.

III

Having considered the questions of the individual and of the boundary as they appear in the Dialectical Theology, the writer proposes to analyze the movement in terms of that which it seeks to accomplish, before turning to the final consideration, which will in turn deal with the interpretation which its thinkers place upon the human capacity for self-transcendence, as offering possibilities for both the highest good and the greatest evil. It must not be overlooked that the crisis theologians have been men whose environment has faced them with tensions, both inner and outer. It was so with the forerunner of the system, Kierkegaard, whose *milieu* impressed him with the element of contradiction inherent in all human existence. Paul Tillich, speaking of his own youth, indicates that his thinking was shaped by the fact that his life was lived upon the boundaries; he grew up in a tension between life in the Mark and life in the Rhineland. In similar manner, Karl Barth was brought to formulate this type of theology under the pressure of circumstances as he heard the roar of artillery across the border from Switzerland during World War I.

More significant than these environmental factors was the fact that these thinkers inherited a turn of mind which was receptive to the Kierkegaardian practice of failing to complete the third side of the Hegelian triangle. Against the tendency toward an optimistic and triumphant attainment of synthesis, Barth in particular finds his mind willing to content itself with openness and unresolved tension, and to balance apparent truth against apparent truth. Brunner recognizes that it is out of such a situation of unresolved contradiction that religious content perennially rises to the surface.[16]

Within the variations which appear in the Dialectical Theology, one common factor appears, namely the attempt upon the part of

[16] Brunner, H. Emil, Man in Revolt, p. 179.

its thinkers to recapture a profound realism with respect to the contemporary situation, both as it appears politically and economically, and as it furnishes a clue to the understanding of human nature. This quest is conditioned by both internal and external conditions: there are certain psychological factors within the personalities of the respective men which serve to color their conclusions; but more important still, the realities of the times appear to them as basically indicative of the realism which ought to mark contemporary thought concerning the nature of man.

The movement rose out of totalitarian changes, and represents a reaction to Humanism, which it feels to be unrealistic in its view of human ability. In an age which is implicitly, if not explicitly, based upon the principles of Humanism, the whole force of history has turned upon the optimistic (and unrealistic) anthropology of modern thinkers. The verdict of history, say these thinkers, is in favor of the more pessimistic view of human nature which is contained in the Bible. They realize that for majorities of men, biblicism is a thing of the past; their problem is that of recapturing a biblical anthropology, while recognizing the hopelessness of a general return to the authority of the Bible.

The crisis theologians have attempted to establish a neo-Augustinianism upon the basis of the "Doctrine of the Word of God." The subtleties of this doctrine are not easily grasped by those outside the system. Its chief principles seem to be as follows: matters of authorship and historicity of the Bible are not a concern to the dialectical theologian; in a Book revealing God to man it is to be expected that absurdities (perhaps better called by the more dignified term 'paradoxes') will occur to the finite reader; and in the Bible the Wholly Other is speaking and revealing to us a 'New World,' and hence in the Bible man is not to hear about God, but to *hear God*.[17]

Questions concerning the historicity and authenticity of the Scriptures assume significance, upon these premises, only upon the level of a rationalistic Christianity. If the God who speaks is *totaliter aliter*, He must not be expected to speak in categories familiar to human logic. But precisely what is the Word of God? Barth tries to enlighten the reader at this point. The Bible is a

[17] Barth, Karl, The Word of God and The Word of Man (Boston, 1928), p. 55.

document of a unique hearing of a unique call, of a unique obedience to a unique command. The Word of God to man centers in the person of Jesus Christ, as manifested in time in terms of the Divine Word. Thus the Bible, while ostensibly set in history, in reality speaks to man in terms of an *Urgeschichte*, a super-history. To 'hear the word of God,' one must read the historical narratives of the Scripture, recognizing that in them is a report of a special situation in which God speaks to a selected individual.[18]

It follows that the Bible is utilized in this system, not as in traditional Christianity, but as a support for the interpretation of human nature which the thinkers in question feel to be indicated by the realities of man's contemporary situation. Chief among the real sources for this type of anthropology is the study of the darker and more distressing periods of history. McConnachie quotes Barth's fellow-traveller, Friedrich Gogarten, as concluding that 'the content of history, so far as it is human history, is the terrible history of sin, of the complete falling away of man from God.'[19] It is possible that a persuasive case may be made in support of this view, though the religious humanist will retort that it represents the error of judging man by his worst performance, and that historical events may be selected in such a manner as to support a more cheerful view.

The Dialectical Theology is relatively little concerned with the question of man's two-fold nature, as a creature of both the world of matter and the world of spirit. Its thinkers are willing to leave the question of man's bodily inheritance to the biologists, while they themselves propose to take the 'spiritual' aspect of his being as the object of study, and to seek to discover in it alone the key to his real nature. Within this phase of human nature the crisis theologians find the abiding antithesis of the discursive reason *versus* the intuitive reason (faith). The denial of the ability of the former to apprehend either the existence or the character of the over-world may be made upon the basis of either one of two factors: (a) the unknowability of the Eternal; or in the inadequacy of the knower. The dialecticians, from Kierkegaard to the

[18] Barth, Kirkliche Dogmatik, p. 118; pp. 344f.

[19] McConnachie, John, The Barthian Theology and the Man of Today (New York: 1933), p. 189. The location of Gogarten's statement is not cited.

present, incline in general to place the onus of the situation upon the knower. Barth is unclear at this point in some of his writings, in which he insists upon the incomprehensibility of God. His difficulty here seems to lie in his failure to distinguish between the knowledge *that* God is from the knowledge of *what* God is.

In asserting the incomprehensibility of the over-world, the crisis theologians lay themselves open to the charge of attempting to revive Kantianism under a different guise. Their definition of the transcendent world answers well to the definition by Kant of the world of *noumena*. Objection has been raised against the system upon this ground by Liberals and Fundamentalists alike. Between Kant's 'pure reason' and the 'discursive reason' of the crisis theologians there appears to be little difference. It remains to be seen whether the 'faith' to which they refer be not the same, or nearly the same, as Kant's 'practical reason.' The discussion of this latter question must be postponed until the rôle of faith in man's transcendence of himself has been examined; at that time the parallelism of function between the 'practical reason' and the 'faith' of the dialecticians will be noted, and the larger question of the epistemology implied by the Dialectical Theology will be briefly considered.

The import of this type of interpretation of human nature is great for the purpose of this discussion, in that it makes the problem of human self-transcendence a specifically religious problem. To the crisis theologian the God-man relationship assumes a radically one-way form. Rejecting the older form of heteronomy in orthodox Christianity, its thinkers seek to substitute for it another and newer heteronomy which they hope may preclude the possibility of a revival of such views of continuity as are entailed, for example, in the Catholic doctrine of the *analogia entis*. This motif of discontinuity is reinforced by the dialectical theologians, not only by means of the doctrine of the 'Word of God' which makes the way from God to man to be a one-way street, but also by means of a renewed emphasis upon the factor of radical evil in human nature.

It is in the attempt at the solution of the problem of the origin of this 'radical evil' that the problem of human self-transcendence assumes its most critical form. The Dialectical Theology seeks to

recapture the Augustinian insights into the question of 'original sin' and to restate these insights in a manner more acceptable to the modern reader. By its doctrines of grace and faith, it makes the problem to be a specifically religious one. In offering a solution, the Crisis Theology proposes to do so in a manner which will indicate at the same time the answers to two questions: (a) What is the source of human moral evil? and (b) What hope does the Christian message offer for a proper re-direction of man's impulse to transcend himself?

IV

The Dialectical Theology is, as has been noted, an attempt to reinstate a proper individualism, to define the proper boundaries of true humanity, and to recapture some view of authority which will establish a type of heteronomy calculated to restore man's sense of moral and spiritual need. In so doing, the movement finds in the instinct for self-transcendence in man a phenomenon with capacities for giving direction to his total moral life, toward either good or evil. Man is set by his Maker within definite and inflexible limits, the limits imposed by the conditions of his spatio-temporal life. Within these more general boundaries there is a quasi-limit, over which man may step (and over which in point of fact he does, without exception, step), but within which he must keep if he is to live within the bounds of the divine will.[20] This quasi-limit is the 'limit of creatureliness.' In other words, to properly fit into his ordained place, man must live in a sustained attitude of recognition of his finiteness.

Precisely what this means is not so clear, but it seems to be as follows: transcending the limits of creatureliness involves the arrogation by one aspect of man's being to a status above that which is normal to it. There is one function of human nature which constantly seeks to get out of hand. If the entire being is to be kept within limits, that function must be reined. The power thus requiring suppression is held to be the reason, which in the exercise of a false self-transcendence issues in pride, considered by the crisis theologians to be the root of sin.

At few points are the dialectical theologians in greater agree-

[20] Niebuhr, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 150.

ment than in the attribution of the origin of human evil to a false attempt at self-transcendence. Such a false attempt is the result, not of an isolated personal incident, but of a fundamentally wrong attitude toward life. It is derived, not from a pattern of life which is in an unqualified sense immoral; it issues from a basically wrong direction in life, held to be characteristic of all men.[21] This false type of self-transcendence lies, thinks Professor Brunner, not in the positing by reason of an Absolute, but rather in the nature of the Absolute which man posits, and the attitude which he assumes toward it. His fundamental wrongness of direction manifests itself in the construction, by a false and illegitimate use of his rational powers, of a God in his own image. The malignity of this error lies in the fact that

> The God of the Bible has nothing to do with the philosophical concept of God, because he is not thought as idea, but apprehended in the historical revelation of himself.[22]

Reinhold Niebuhr reaches substantially the same conclusion at this point. His indictment of modern culture is levelled at the tendency in that culture to identify God with some level of human consciousness, or with some order of nature. Man, instead of being himself judged in a continual KRISIS in which he is confronted with God, fabricates a 'God' who is but the lengthened shadow of himself. In thus asserting his autonomy, man fails to recognize his true stature, and instead, views the achievement of his own rational efforts as the pinnacle of self-transcending activity.[23] In so doing, man actually blinds himself to the nature of transcendent reality. The means by which this pernicious tendency may be corrected is less clearly stated, either in Niebuhr or in the writings of the other thinkers under study.

Karl Barth speaks as follows:

> Bereft of understanding and left to themselves, men are at the mercy of the dominion of the meaningless powers of the world; for our life in this world has meaning only in its relation to the true God . . .

[21] Brunner, H. Emil, Our Faith (New York, 1936), p. 41; Man in Revolt, p. 38.
[22] Brunner, H. Emil, God and Man (London, 1936), p. 54.
[23] Op. cit., p. 124. Cf. also p. 131.

> This relation can be re-established only through the — *clearly seen* — memory of eternity breaking in upon our minds and hearts.[24]

This quotation indicates the direction which its author feels that *true* human self-transcendence must take. Taken in the religious sense presupposed by the Dialectical Theology as a whole, the phenomenon, in its proper and legitimate sense, must be understood in terms of the attainment of man of a knowledge (theoretical or intuitive) concerning the over-world. This knowledge will center in a knowledge of a Divine Being, who will serve as a canon of measurement for the whole of human life and human activity. Since the relation between God and man is conceived as being a one-way relation, and since man's power of knowing God has been corrupted through a false attempt at self-transcendence, these thinkers are at pains to establish on some new basis the doctrine of faith.

The most conspicuous evidence of inconsistency within the movement appears in the lack of constancy with which its thinkers view the doctrines of Grace and Faith, and the difficult interpretations which they place upon them. Barth and Brunner have kept relatively close to an 'evangelical' type of theology, with Brunner straying toward an emphasis upon ethics as his view of the question of the boundary shifted. Other thinkers, notably Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, have moved 'onward from Barth,' and instead of dwelling upon these more specifically theological tenets, have turned their energies toward the task of interpenetrating society with the principles which they find to lie at the heart of the Christian message.

To Barth, with his horror of 'religious experience' Grace assumes the form of mercy extended by God to man. At this point he follows Calvin rather than Augustine, in minimizing the view of grace as the extension of divine power to man, for the purpose of lifting his level of life to the Biblical standard. Barth's doctrine of redemption is primarily forensic; it issues in an 'understanding' of God through the KRISIS, rather than in a knowledge of God which redirects the energies of the life.

Barth's view of faith appears to be something quite other from

[24] Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, p. 48.

what it meant to the Reformers. Nowhere does he give his concrete definition of this term; for an intimation of what he means by it, it is necessary to note that which Barth holds to be accomplished for man through faith. Whereas sin is essentially a loss of the knowledge of God, and the substitution of a demonic concept of a 'God in our image,' so 'salvation' consists in the recapture of a true knowledge of God. As the receiving subject, man is minimized and his own exercise of faith is not of major significance. The term 'faith' in Romans 1:17 is rendered by Barth 'faithfulness, and is attributed to God. Man assumes the rôle of passive recipient. The Revealing God breaks into human experience and human consciousness, and is grasped by the individual, not through the discursive reason, but by a faculty which recognizes in the overwhelming KRISIS that God is.[25]

Before proceeding further with this discussion, it is necessary to note briefly the larger question of the epistemology implied by the Dialectical Theology. The writer is aware that much difference of interpretation is possible at this point. Some present-day scholars are disposed to view this theology as necessarily rooted in criticism. These find in the Critique of Pure Reason the key to the understanding of Barth and Brunner. Others feel that these thinkers utilize the critical philosophy merely as a weapon with which to level the old citadels of rationalistic theology. To settle this question, it is necessary to examine the writings, particularly those of Barth and Brunner, seeking there to discover whether the use of the critical epistemology is essential to their system, or whether it is employed merely to establish a skepticism upon which a 'Biblical theology' can be erected.

Barth has, from the beginning of his career, been unequivocal in his rejection of traditional metaphysics. He insists that the world of being is non-structural, and that the world of value is its formal correlate. And inasmuch as the principle of individuation is non-rational in character, an existential *system* is impossible.[26]

[25] Barth, Kirkliche Dogmatik, pp. 206ff. This view has undergone a substantial modification at the hands of Emil Brunner, who in his The Divine-Human Encounter (Philadelphia, 1943) makes a place for man's active response to the Word of God. See pp. 68ff.

[26] See in his articles in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1909, pp. 405ff; and 475ff.

For religious thought this implies that such terms as God, creation, image of God, and sin are limiting, not constitutive, conceptions. Historical relativism, growing out of the relation of correlativity of brute factuality and abstract rationality, can be transcended only in the realm of super-history (*Urgeschichte*). Nature cannot be the means by which God reveals himself to man, since it is only phenomenal; natural theology can be only regulative.

Brunner is in substantial agreement with Barth at these points. Feeling that 'the entirely single thing' is not available to the mind, and that all-embracing rationality is impossible of attainment by man, he holds these concepts to be correlatives, being limiting concepts which work coöperatively in the knowing situation. Knowledge emerges from the resulting dialectic.[27] Within this scheme the individual is ineffable, not to be found in the phenomenal world. In other words the individual is super-historical, being with faithful Abraham beyond 'the line of death.' Contrariwise, the autonomous man, finding the 'Wholly Other' in himself, accepts only that which he has created.[28]

Christian theology becomes thus a formalization of the polarities existing with the Individual in contradiction. The Individual is the larger subject in whom the older subject and object are swallowed up; his own being lies in his ideal identification with God. Barth's doctrine of super-history begins with his negative criticism of ordinary history. He would transcend the historical relativism, however, by moving from negation (which cannot reveal the infinite) to an affirmation, by means of a radical idea of transcendence, in which we reach the realm of super-history, wherein time is dissolved 'in Christ.'

It is within this realm that faith operates. To be sure, man possesses both a higher and a lower nature. Both of these are limiting notions. By faith man sets his own ideal, personifying it as 'Christ.' The self that behaves in faith is no longer a historical (phenomenal) self, but a 'new self' able to hear the Word of God because knowing itself as not existing.[29]

From the foregoing it is apparent that so far as knowledge of the

[27] Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 55–62; pp. 116f.
[28] Barth, Epistle to the Romans, pp. 346ff; see also p. 120.
[29] Barth, Kirkliche Dogmatik, p. 287.

phenomenal world is concerned, Barth and Brunner are dominated in their thinking by the critical philosophy. Their deviation from Kantianism seems to lie chiefly in their interpretation of the possibility and the mode of the attainment of super-temporal knowledge. They agree with Kant that any view of reality which takes into account only the world of appearances will end with a series of permanent contradictions, insoluble at the phenomenal level. With respect to the attainment of non-phenomenal knowledge, the Dialectical Theology disagrees with Kant in his belief that the practical reason, which is the property of all men, can in itself transcend the phenomenal world by acting as a *noumenon*. To the crisis theologian this is a dangerous heresy; man is held to possess nothing which renders him akin either to God or to eternity.

The chief difficulty of interpretation at this point lies in the fact that Barth and Brunner couch their discussion of 'faith' in ambiguous language. It seems clear, however, that to them faith is something other than Kant's practical reason, since it is in reality empty of content, and in its pure form independent of the categories of intellectual construction. It is not, therefore, regulated by the ethical demand, or by any other formal requirement. Faith operates rather in the realm of super-history, and especially as this is mediated in the Scriptures. As faith moves from dialectical negation to a more profound dialectical affirmation, it reaches 'Christ' by a leap, and finding Him it transcends the relativities of history and identifies its subject with the non-historical 'children of Abraham.'

In the light of this rather paradoxical definition of faith, the writer hesitates to equate it with Kant's practical reason, and contents himself with pointing out that the two serve the same function, that of laying hold of the transcendent world. Concerning the larger question of whether the Dialectical Theology is crypto-Kantianism, the writer feels that the facts warrant nothing more than the observation that there are obvious parallels between the two systems, but that there are important differences, and that these occur at points most crucial for the type of theology in question.

It is now possible to draw some general conclusions concerning

the manner in which the problem of human self-transcendence determines the chief features of the Dialectical Theology. The term 'human self-transcendence' is employed by its thinkers to denote three things:

1. Man's attempt to transcend the factors which limit his physical, mental, and ethical living.
2. Man's tendency to make himself his own object.
3. Man's quest for a center beyond himself, and for a knowledge of the super-mundane in general and of a Supreme Being in particular.[30]

A false exercise of this power is that in which man seeks to transcend the 'limit of creatureliness' and to assert his independence of God. This is a significant feature of the Crisis Theology, and one which constitutes a contribution to theology which is currently both valued and feared. It shifts the locus of sin from sensuality to pride and seeks to challenge modern man in his exaggerated emphasis upon scientific and technological progress. In thus 'concluding all under sin' these thinkers insist that the contemporary quest for transcendence of the factors which limit man's living is so conducted as to blind the seeker to the deeper dimensions of human life. This does not mean that they disparage scientific achievement; they rather protest the current penchant for making such achievement the ultimate norm by which human existence is to be judged. In other words they denounce the tendency to view man within a purely humanistic frame of reference, without regard for his dependence upon a transcendent Being to whose freedom man is subordinate.[31]

Man's ability to make himself his own object is likewise capable of both constructive and destructive use. Modern man is charged with a vicious inconsistency, in seeking on the one hand to conceive himself chiefly in terms of the uniqueness of his rational faculties, while at the same time yielding to those trends of thought which issue in loss of true individuality. In seeking to reinstate the Christian sense of individuality (as against mere numerical particularity) the dialectical theologians seek to do justice to the

[30] Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 55.
[31] Ibid., p. 92.

manner in which man is able to stand outside and above nature, and at the same time to draw attention to the limitations of reason, particularly in the sphere of ethics. While man may make himself his own object, he cannot completely subordinate natural impulse to his reason. And it is in the pride that he can do so that his essential sinfulness appears.

In his quest for a center beyond himself, and for knowledge of the super-mundane in general and of a Supreme Being in particular, man is confronted by two worlds, existing in radical disjunction. The system presents God as one who is unknowable, yet who reveals himself. Man, by accepting 'God's point of view' may share that which He knows. It must be remembered also that to the dialectical theologian *revelation implies salvation.* The way to transcendent knowledge (and to salvation) is not to be thought of in terms of a return to the Jesus of history, for to the thinkers under question the study of the life of Jesus ends where the study of all transcendent reality ends, in an absolute paradox.

The entire process of 'salvation' is thus seen in terms of man's true self-transcendence, which is viewed in fideistic terms, and in which the human function is reduced to a minimum. As man meets the paradox which is KRISIS, human reason is brought to an impasse and is transcended in the 'moment' of revelation.

In conclusion, it is fitting to inquire precisely what the dialectical theologians seek to explain upon the basis of the employment of the motif of 'human self-transcendence.' From this discussion emerges a two-fold answer to this inquiry. First, in their attempt to account for the 'radical badness' of man, the crisis theologians seek to place the 'fall' beyond temporal origin. Rejecting the traditional account of Adam, they attempt, in these terms, to establish in its place a doctrine of the 'fall' upon dialectical and super-historical grounds.

The second branch of service into which the motif under study is impressed is that of affording a frame of reference within which can be set a doctrine of 'salvation.' In the exercise of 'faith' man transcends that aspect of himself that is involved in historical relativism, and reaches into the realm of super-history. In so doing he identifies himself with the cosmic process by which evil is transcended in the triumph of good. In the 'leap of faith' into

the realm of *Urgeschichte* men transcend their phenomenal 'selves' and participate in the revelatory process in which lies the essence of salvation. In thus transcending himself, man enters the area in which major issues are decided. There the individual becomes 'contemporaneous' with Christ.

It follows, therefore, that the Dialectical Theology sees human self-transcendence in a two-fold light. And while its employment as a term in the writings is not always clear, it represents no mere juggling of words. Rather, the motif is used to provide a rationale for the twin doctrines of the 'fall' and of 'salvation' as they are dialectically conceived.

ZEUS PELORIS

A note of mine written under war conditions [1] may now be supplemented from literature to which I recently had access. I had proved, with the help of a Greek coin of Phalanna in Thessaly which is preserved in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, that the Zeus of the Thessalian *Peloria* had the name *Peloris*, not *Pelorios*. The latter is only the reading of the Epitome of Athenaeus against the best Athenaeus MS, the Codex Marcianus 447. I learned now that Professor Paul Maas [2] had already demonstrated most plausibly in 1935 and 1936 that the so-called Athenaeus-Epitome is nothing more than an abbreviated revision, a *metagraphe*, of a MS of the type of Codex Marcianus 447. It is therefore without value here for reconstituting Athenaeus' text. We now have a primary document that decisively supports Professor Maas' thesis, and it is a rare occasion in textual criticism that the decisive primary document is a coin. Professor Maas' suggestion [3] however that Πελώρι which occurs in Cod. Marc. 447 has the nominative Πέλωρ, can now be slightly corrected by the evidence of our coin. It can be said with certainty that the nominative is in fact *Peloris*.

The religious problem involved has been treated meanwhile by Dr. Paula Philippson [4] in an attractive monograph. If she is right a Poseidon *Peloros*, husband of Gaia *Pelora*, originally provided an outlet to the Sea for the waters which flooded the Thessalian plains, and appeared as a messenger before king *Pelasgos* with this good news. It was only later that Zeus *Peloris* took Poseidon's place as the main god of the *Peloria*, and the attributes of the latter have so much in common with those of the early Poseidon that the two gods may even have been identical. It is perhaps not a coincidence, although the *argumentum e silentio* is always dangerous, that the *Peloris* head on the Obv. of the Cambridge coin and of Syll. Num. Graec. Copenhagen 208 is not ex-

[1] F. M. Heichelheim, "On Athenaeus XIV, 639e–640a." Harvard Theol. Rev. XXXVII (1944), No. 4. Cf. the final publication of this coin in the forthcoming Sylloge Nummerum Graecorum IV, 3 (1947), Nr. 2434 and plate XLV. The reading on the *Obv.* of the similar coin Sylloge Nummerum Graecorum Copenhagen, "Thessaly-Illyria" (ed. Schwabacher, 1943), Nr. 208 should be restored to [πs] λο [ρις] or [πε] λο [ρις].

[2] "Eustathios als Konjekturalkritiker," Byzantinische Zeitschrift XXXV (1935), pp. 299–307; XXXVI (1936), pp. 27–31.

[3] Professor Maas in Liddell-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, II (1940), p. 2098 s.v. πέλωρ.

[4] Thessalische Mythologie (Zurich, 1944), pp. 25 f., 35 f., 44, 60, 95, 114, 154. Correct Miss Philippson's *Pelorios* to *Peloris* on these pages.

pressly represented as either Zeus or Poseidon. Indeed that the Rev. of both coins shows the nymph Phalanna and the Cambridge coin a stork may even speak slightly in Poseidon's favor. On the other hand, the *Peloria* festival must have played a great rôle in Phalanna, and it may be that the nymph of this town and a stork were shown on the same coin as the head of the *Peloris* because they were mentioned in the *Peloria* myth which is not completely known to us.

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THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE BIBLE

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One of the minor mysteries that float about the cloud-wrapped figure of Thomas Jefferson has to do with his quaint little scrap-book known as the "Morals of Jesus." It relates to the books he used in making it. Of course if he had meant it to be published, or had ever thought it might be, he would have stated at the beginning just what editions of the Greek, Latin, French and English New Testaments he had cut his clippings from. But he did not intend it to be published; he made it for his own use and satisfaction, to read just before he went to bed, when the day's work was over. So the problem was left for us to solve.

When a kind neighbor gave me her father's copy of the "Jefferson Bible," some time ago, she aroused my professional curiosity to a degree neither of us anticipated. It was a handsome old book, bound in red leather, published by Congress forty years ago in full facsimile, and distributed to the number of nine thousand copies by senators and congressmen to their valued constituents. My copy seems to have been given by Senator Quarles of Wisconsin to his friend Mr. J. D. Ross, and it was Mr. Ross' daughter, Mrs. Matthew Pearce McCullough, who gave it to me.

It is not really a Bible at all, of course, nor even a New Testament, but a series of selections from the gospels, comprising what Thomas Jefferson considered the most valuable parts of Jesus' teaching. He made such a scrap-book first for the moral education of the Indians, but that has disappeared. Later he made this one, on a more pretentious plan, for it presents the selections in parallel columns in Greek, Latin, French and English.

When Congress published this facsimile edition in 1904, Cyrus Adler, the Librarian of the Smithsonian, identified the English clippings as taken from a King James New Testament published by Jacob Johnson in Philadelphia in 1804. But the editions from which Jefferson derived his Greek, Latin and French texts have never been identified.

It was this problem that haunted me, particularly the problem of exactly what edition of the Greek New Testament Jefferson cut these clippings from. Indeed I felt a certain responsibility in the matter. For have I not spent much of my life with the old editions of the Greek Testament, Erasmus, Stephens, Beza, Elzevir, and the rest, and should I

not be able to recognize one so common that Jefferson could pick up a couple of copies of it, simply by writing to his bookseller in Philadelphia?

For that was what he did. He had tried to persuade Joseph Priestley, the independent English preacher who discovered oxygen, but was driven out of England for his original views, to make such a selection from the gospels, and Priestley seemed inclined to do it. Jefferson had planned to do it himself, but felt that Priestley could do it better, and welcomed his consent to undertake the task, though he admitted in a letter to Priestley written on January 4, 1804, that he had "already sent to Philadelphia to get two testaments (Greek), of the same edition, and two English, with the design to cut out the morsels of morality and paste them in the leaves of a book." But just one month later Priestley died, and Jefferson himself took the plan up again. — It is interesting to read that Priestley's great-grandson was H. H. Richardson, the leading American architect of his generation.

The scrap-book planned with Priestley, unlike the one meant for the Indians and completed in 1813, was evidently planned to present the Greek text in parallel columns with the English. But when in 1819 it was completed, it proved to contain not only the Greek and English but the Latin and French as well. How did this come about? For in 1804 the President had ordered only the Greek and English New Testaments, to use in making his scrap-book, and evidently had in mind nothing more than a two-column arrangement.

The little red leather volume, whenever I picked it up, or merely saw it standing on the second shelf in the corner, always raised a question in my mind: What was the Greek text that Jefferson used? it kept saying to me. Of all the thousand printed editions of the Greek New Testament, which one did his bookseller send him from Philadelphia, in response to his order reported to Priestley early in 1804?

I presently observed that there was never any sign of division left by the Presidential scissors between the Greek and the Latin columns; and it dawned upon me (as I have since learned it had dawned upon others) that they had come to him together, so that his Greek Testament must have been a Greek-Latin one. He did not have to search out the Latin parallels for his Greek; they came to him already united on a single page. This at once cut down the possible candidates by more than half, since most Greek Testaments are not accompanied by a Latin version. I began to see a very thin ray of light upon the problem.

There was nothing very distinctive about the Greek text, but the Latin was decidedly odd. It was very different from the Latin Vulgate, and not like the private versions of Erasmus or Beza. It was in fact a

very dubious kind of Latin, for it frequently used the infinitive to express purpose, a thing abhorrent to an old Latin master like myself, who had spent the best part of his youth teaching young people never to do this.

Now if, as Adler had showed, Jefferson's English column was made up from New Testaments dated 1804, his Greek Testaments, ordered from Philadelphia about the same time, were in all probability of about that date. I therefore inquired of the reference librarian of the Huntington Library at San Marino, California, what Greek-Latin edition published about 1800 they possessed, and was told that they had just such a book, published by Bradford of Philadelphia about the time I mentioned. I immediately visited the library and eagerly examined it.

It proved to contain the same Greek Text and the same Latin version that Jefferson had used, and in type and style of printing it was also remarkably close to the book used by Jefferson. But slight differences in type and printing showed that the two were not identical; moreover it was dated 1806 which seemed to rule it out.

The title page described its Greek text as that of Johannes Leusden, well-known New Testament editor of Utrecht, and its Latin version as that of Benedictus Arias Montanus (Benito Arias Montano, 1527–98), the Spanish editor of the Antwerp polyglot of 1569–72.

Bradford's edition thus settled the two questions a scholar would ask, namely: Whose Greek text did Jefferson use, and whose Latin version? It was Leusden's Greek text (first published in Utrecht in 1675), with the preface of the Amsterdam edition of 1698, and the Latin translation of Benedictus Arias Montanus that Jefferson used in making his famous scrap-book. The eccentricities of Benedictus' Latin version were due to the fact that he made it simply as an interlinear, to accompany the Greek text of the New Testament in the sixth volume of his Antwerp polyglot, and where the Greek used an infinitive of purpose he followed it in his Latin!

But I still felt that New Testament learning owed a kind of debt to the memory of Jefferson, to identify the actual edition which he so patiently clipped and pasted into his gospel scrap-book. Bradford's edition stated that it was itself based upon the latest London edition of Leusden's Greek Testament, which further research indicated was probably one printed by Wingrave and others in 1794. Various eastern libraries admitted that they possessed copies of this work, and my obliging neighbor Dr. Lawrence C. Powell, librarian of the University of California at Los Angeles, kindly borrowed the Yale copy for comparison.

It was an exciting moment when I opened the little brown leather volume to ask it my long unanswered question, and if possible pay the debt of New Testament scholarship to the most erudite of presidents. But the answer was not in doubt for an instant. One glance was enough to decide it. It was indeed Wingrave's printing of 1794 that Jefferson purchased two copies of and painstakingly clipped the verses from, in making his scrap-book on "The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth extracted textually from the Gospels in Greek Latin, French & English." In fact on a few leaves of the scrap-book he has pasted whole pages of the London edition — 19 (p. 201), 46 (p. 214), 51 (p. 54), 57 (p. 63), and 77 (p. 238, interrupted by Matt. 27:13).

Jefferson's scrap-book contained two folding maps, one of the Holy Land, on which was printed "page 1," and the other of the Eastern Mediterranean, on which was printed "page 414." These maps he had simply detached from the 1794 Greek Testament, to which these page numbers refer and in the surviving copies of which they may still be found. The first map precedes page 1 of the 1794 New Testament; the other follows page 414, the end of the Acts. This second one had nothing to do with the "Morals of Jesus," and Jefferson must have pasted it in simply because he wanted to keep it. We must remember that this scrap-book was never intended for publication but only for Jefferson's personal reading and enjoyment. But the maps confirm the identification of the London edition of 1794 as Jefferson's Greek Testament.

This London edition is a fat little volume, 4 inches by 6¼ in size, and 1¾ inches thick. It is bound in calf or sheep, and on the red leather label is printed "Leusden's Greek Testament." Its pages measured 6⅛ by 3⅝ inches, and the type face, without the running head, measures 5⅛ by $2\frac{15}{16}$ inches, — almost exactly its size in the facsimile edition. The text is preceded by Leusden's preface of 1698, in which he recognizes the erratic character of Benedictus Arias' Latin version, and seeks to defend his use of it.

There remains only the problem of what French text Jefferson used for his third column; or is there the more basic question of why he introduced a French column at all? You remember that when he wrote Priestley on Jan. 4, 1804, all he had ordered of his Philadelphia bookseller was "two testaments (Greek), of the same edition, and two English," — evidently contemplating no more at that time than a two column arrangement, Greek and English.

It would appear that what the bookseller sent him was two copies of the Leusden Greek-Latin New Testament, and this suggested to Jefferson including the Latin with the Greek, since they were already so con-

veniently united in the copies before him. Then as he could hardly put three columns on a page, his mind moved on to a four column plan, and of course for a man who had spent years in France, four of them as American minister there, French was the natural choice for the third column. At any rate, in the scrap-book the Greek and Latin occupy the left hand page, and the French and English the right hand.

I am no expert in the various French versions of the New Testament, and after some casting about I addressed the reference department of the British Museum, enclosing a careful transcript of one of Jefferson's French columns. I was rewarded by the redoubtable Mr. L. A. Sheppard, of the Department of Printed Books, with the news that it was clearly from some edition of J. F. Ostervald's translation of the New Testament, but did not exactly correspond with any printing of it in the Museum Library. He went on to say that the Museum's copy of the Jefferson facsimile was destroyed in the fire of May 10th, 1941, a catastrophe of which I had not heard. (This volume of course we hastened to supply.)

Jean Frédéric Ostervald (1663–1747) was a Swiss Protestant leader who in 1724 produced a revision of the French Bible. His version, more thoroughly revised in 1744, has had a wide influence in England as well as on the continent, and even in America. The last printing of it that I have noticed was in 1915, and I have examined editions of it printed in Paris, London, Boston, and New York.

Mr. Sheppard's kind suggestion was of course immediately followed up as far as possible, and with the generous aid of friendly librarians copies of Ostervald as far back as 1779 were consulted, and more recent editions were borrowed and examined, especially those of 1813 (Paris), 1811 (Boston), and 1807 (London). The further back we went among these last, the closer the approximation to Jefferson's exact forms of wording and printing became. No copy of the 1805 edition could be located in this country. But Canon Coleman of the British and Foreign Bible Society in London, being invoked, assured us that no Ostervald from 1805 to 1820, in the Bible Society Library, read exactly with the Jefferson French text.

Our thoughts therefore turned to the 1802 Ostervald in that Library, especially as its size, as reported in the great Darlow and Moule catalogue, 4 by 7 inches, was just what Jefferson's French column would lead us to expect, but no copy of that edition could be located in this country. And now a letter from Miss Millicent Sowerby, of the Congressional Library, the recognized authority on Jefferson's books and letters, threw a new light upon the problem. She very kindly informed

me that on January 31, 1805, Mr. Jefferson wrote to Reibelt of Philadelphia ordering two copies of "Le Nouveau Testament corrigé sur le Grec. in 12mo Paris 1803," which he had seen in Reibelt's catalogue. Reibelt sent him the books on February 2, asking $1.60 for them, which the President paid on March 1.

This seemed to be identical with the Paris Ostervald edition described in the Bible Society catalogue as "Le Nouveau Testament . . . Exactement revu et corrigé sur le texte Grec. (L.M.S.) J. Smith: Paris. An. XI. (1802)." The apparent difference in date, as Miss Anne Pratt, the Yale reference librarian, has kindly pointed out to me, is due to the fact that books printed in Paris at that time bore only the year of the new French Republican calendar, according to which "An. XI" covered the last quarter of 1802 (from September 23 on) and three quarters, down to September 22, of 1803. The anno Domini dates 1802, 1803 are supplied by the cataloguers to the best of their knowledge, so that a book dated An. XI might be referred to 1802 or 1803. It must be remembered that Ostervald's version had never been printed in France at all until this Bible Society edition of 1802–3.

It was now virtually certain that Jefferson's French text was the Ostervald published in Paris in 1802. Yet my mind was not at rest, until there came at long last from Canon Coleman at the Bible Society in London a photograph of two pages of that elusive edition, showing Luke 15:26–17:6. A glance at this glossy print was enough. Virtual certainty gave way to absolute. It was indeed the Paris Ostervald of the year XI of the French Republican calendar, that Reibelt sent to President Jefferson, on February 2, 1805, for use in his New Testament labors.

It is clear that by January 1805, Jefferson was planning a four column arrangement, and ordering the two French copies he would require in carrying it out, and that it was the Paris Ostervald of 1802–3 that he used for his French column. I only regret that I have been unable to locate a copy of that edition of Ostervald in any library in this country.

Copies of Leusden's Greek Testament printed in London in 1794 are to be found in the libraries not only of Yale but of New York, Pennsylvania, Congress, Union Theological Seminary and Andover-Newton. It would be interesting to exhibit it occasionally side by side with the facsimile edition of Jefferson's "Morals of Jesus," which derived half its contents and both its maps from that book.

And how like the many-sided Jefferson to produce out of the gospels his own personal manual of religious devotion, in four of the greatest languages of ancient and modern times!